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IN DEFENSE OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT
Wilson Ray Huhn*
These economic royalists complain that we seek to overthrow the in-
stitutions of America. What they really complain of is that we seek
to take away their power. Our allegiance to American institutions
requires the overthrow of this kind of power. In vain they seek to
hide behind the flag and the Constitution. In their blindness they
forget what the flag and the Constitution stand for. Now, as always,
they stand for democracy, not tyranny; for freedom, not subjection;
and against a dictatorship by mob rule and the overprivileged alike.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, June 27, 1936
ABSTRACT
The overriding purpose of the New Deal was to create opportu-
nities for the common person to acquire a stake in society. The
Roosevelt appointees to the Supreme Court were unwilling to allow ei-
ther entrenched wealth or arbitrary governmental action to interfere
with that objective. They remade the Constitution, but in so doing
they returned the Constitution to its original purpose - the protection
of personal liberty. The Roosevelt Court laid the foundation for a juris-
prudence of human rights upon which the Warren Court and
subsequent Supreme Courts have continued to build.
Two justices presently serving on the Supreme Court - Justice
Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas - oppose many of the
principles established by the Roosevelt Court, and they wish to turn
back the clock to the interpretation of Constitution as it was prior to
1937. The purpose of this article is to describe and defend the human
rights revolution of the Roosevelt Court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to describe the principles of human
rights that were established by the Roosevelt Court, and to defend
those principles from attacks that have been leveled against them by
two present members of the Supreme Court, Justice Antonin Scalia
and Justice Clarence Thomas.
From 1937 to 1954 the balance of power on the United States
Supreme Court was in the hands of justices who had been appointed by
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.1 It is well-known, at least
among lawyers and historians, that 1937 was the turning point in the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause.2 Less appre-
ciated is the fact that the Roosevelt Court also initiated a revolution in
the interpretation of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3
1. See generally WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, THE GREAT JUSTICES: 1941-1954 (2006)
(focusing on the period of time that Roosevelt appointees Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter,
William Douglas, and Robert Jackson served together on the Supreme Court); JEFFREY D.
HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK,
FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H. JACKSON (1996) (contrasting the judicial reasoning of
Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson). See also infra text accompanying notes 30-43.
2. See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941)
(describing the then-recent doctrinal shift towards upholding the constitutionality of
commercial and social legislation); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
235 (1993) (stating that in 1937 "there was a real conversion in a majority of the Supreme
Court and its effects do justify the 'constitutional revolution' characterization."); see also
infra text accompanying notes 242-60.
3. See generally WILLIAM M. WIECEK, 12 OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION:
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Considering the Constitution as law, before 1937 there was lit-
tle judicial protection for the constitutional rights that we now take for
granted.4 The concept of a general constitutional right to privacy was
little more than a theory that had been proposed by Justice Louis
Brandeis. 5 Religious belief was protected, but religiously motivated
conduct was not.6 The requirement of the Separation of Church and
State that is implicit in the Establishment Clause had been acknowl-
edged by the Court but had never been applied to invalidate any law.7
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953 (2006) (a comprehensive description of the
justices and decisions of the Roosevelt Court); id. at 707 ("The Court between West Coast
Hotel and Brown v. Board of Education seems condemned to obscurity, if not scorn, [but
tihis undeserved low repute of the Court and its Justices devalues the real significance of
their work."); id. ("The most striking feature [of the Court's jurisprudence during this era] is
the dominance of civil liberties and civil rights issues in its work.").
4. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (observing that the framers
considered the Constitution to be "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation."); but
see Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial Review and Core Civil Liberties, 41 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2006) (challenging, in effect, the premise that the Constitution should be
considered binding law in certain circumstances and proposing "a form of judicial review in
which judges' rulings on constitutional questions are expressly open to legislative revision
in the short run."); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING
PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000)
(describing three 19th Century American political movements, outside the judicial context,
defending freedom of expression).
5. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting) ("The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the use, as evidence in a criminal
proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.").
See also Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890); Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis' and Warren's "The Right to Privacy and the Birth
of the Right to Privacy," 69 TENN. L. REV. 623, 624 (2002) ("In the more than 110 years since
its publication, Brandeis and Warren's article has attained what some might call legendary
status. It has been widely recognized by scholars and judges, past and present, as the
seminal force in the development of a 'right to privacy' in American law."). See infra text
accompanying notes 158-69.
6. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (Waite, C.J.) ("Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which
were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order."). See also infra text
accompanying notes 223-30.
7. See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (Waite, C.J.). After quoting Jefferson for the
proposition that the First Amendment builds "a wall of separation between church and
state," the Court stated, "Coming as this does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates
of the measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative declaration of the scope and
effect of the amendment thus secured."). However, the Court in Reynolds failed to find that
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Until 1930, protection for freedom of expression was but a vision ex-
pressed in the passionate dissents of Justice Brandeis and Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, and although the Court had begun to protect
freedom of speech and press after 1930, the Roosevelt Court made
enormous progress on this front after 1937.8 Finally, before 1937. the
Supreme Court was at best indifferent, if not hostile, to the plight of
blacks and other minorities, largely neglecting to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.9
The interpretation of the Constitution changed because Frank-
lin Delano Roosevelt appointed a series of justices to the Supreme
Court who were devoted to the principles that are stated in the Consti-
tution and which motivated the framers, but which the Supreme Court
had, until 1937, largely failed to enforce.
On January 6, 1941, Roosevelt delivered his State of the Union
Address, "The Four Freedoms," as he girded the country for worldwide
war against Germany and Japan. 10 Roosevelt outlined the threats
that America faced from abroad, and the sacrifices that would be nec-
essary to meet those threats, but he chose to emphasize, as the
centerpiece of his address, not military preparedness, but rather why
we must fight - what it is that makes our society worth fighting for. In
his address he distinguished our society from the fascist governmental,
economic, and social systems of Germany and Japan. He first de-
scribed what ordinary people expect from their society:
The basic things expected by our people of their political and eco-
nomic systems are simple. They are:
Equality of opportunity for youth and for others.
Jobs for those who can work.
Security for those who need it.
The ending of special privilege for the few.
The preservation of civil liberties for all.
The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a wider and con-
stantly rising standard of living.11
the federal law forbidding polygamy in United States Territories violated the First
Amendment. See id. at 166 (Waite, C.J.) ("In our opinion, the statute immediately under
consideration is within the legislative power of Congress."). See also infra text
accompanying notes 231-38.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 170-217.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 309-12.
10. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress: The "Four
Freedoms" Speech, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum (January 6,
1941), http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/4free.html, last visited September 17, 2007;
STAMFORD PARKER, THE WORDS THAT RESHAPED AMERICA: FDR 157-66 (2000) (excerpting
from address); KENNETH S. DAviS, FDR: THE WAR PRESIDENT 96-97 (2000) (summarizing
address).
11. PARKER, supra note 10, at 164-65.
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Roosevelt then articulated what he considered to be the basic
human rights - the Four Freedoms:
In the future days which we seek to make secure, we look forward
to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first
is freedom of speech and expression - everywhere in the world. The
second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way -
everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want, which,
translated into world terms, means economic understandings which
will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabi-
tants - everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear,
which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction
of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that
no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggres-
sion against any neighbor - anywhere in the world. 12
Franklin Roosevelt fought passionately and tirelessly for the ec-
onomic rights of workers, 13 and he led us to victory in the war against
totalitarian fascism, 14 but it was Eleanor Roosevelt who most elo-
quently gave voice to the drive for human rights within this Nation
and on the world stage. It was Eleanor who descended into the coal
mines 15 and who exposed the extreme poverty of the people of Ap-
palachia 1' - it was Eleanor who met with and supported civil rights
12. Id. at 165-66.
13. See id. at 104-105 (quoting Roosevelt's speech to the Democratic Convention on
June 27, 1936) ("The royalists of the economic order have conceded that political freedom
was the business of the government, but they have maintained that economic slavery was
nobody's business. They granted that the government could protect the citizen in his right
to vote, but they denied that the government could do anything to protect the citizen in his
right to work and his right to live. Today we stand committed to the proposition that
freedom is no half-and-half affair. If the average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in
the polling place, he must have equal opportunity in the market place. These economic
royalists complain that we seek to overthrow the institutions of America. What they really
complain of is that we seek to take away their power. Our allegiance to American
institutions requires the overthrow of this kind of power. In vain they seek to hide behind
the flag and the Constitution. In their blindness they forget what the flag and the
Constitution stand for. Now, as always, they stand for democracy, not tyranny; for freedom,
not subjection; and against a dictatorship by mob rule and the overprivileged alike."). See
also Cass R. Sunstein & Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and Roosevelt's
Second Bill of Rights: A Dialog, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 205 (2005) (debating the significance of
Roosevelt's "Second Bill of Rights," contained in his State of the Union Address of January
11, 1944).
14. See generally DAvis, supra note 10.
15. See CANDACE FLEMING, OUR ELEANOR: A SCRAPBOOK LOOK AT ELEANOR
RoOSEvELT's REMARKABLE LIFE 88 (2005) (showing Eleanor Roosevelt taking a 2 1k mile trip
underground into an Ohio mine).
16. See id. at 94 ("One day a journalist named Frank Kingdon entered a miner's shack
and was astounded to find Eleanor Roosevelt sitting on a stained, bare mattress. She was
holding a thin, naked baby on her lap while the mother stirred a pot of watery soup in the
stove. 'The two women were discussing their household problems as though that
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leaders A. Philip Randolph, Walter White, and Mary McCleod Be-
thune17 - it was Eleanor who publicly resigned from the Daughters of
the American Revolution when that organization refused to allow
Marion Anderson to perform at Constitution Hall"' - it was Eleanor
who opposed the internment of the Japanese-American citizens and
resident aliens,' 9 who urged Franklin to send the Tuskegee Airmen
into combat, 20 and who, throughout World War II, persistently main-
tained that victory abroad was not enough, and that our Nation would
be truly victorious only if we achieved equality at home2 ' - and finally,
Appalachian hut was no different from a Washington drawing room,' the journalist
declared.").
17. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, No ORDINARY TIME: FRANKLIN AND ELEANOR
ROOSEVELT: THE HOME FRONT IN WORLD WAR II 161-72 (describing Eleanor's address to the
Convention of Sleeping Car Porters on September 16, 1940, at the invitation of A. Philip
Randolph, and her subsequent efforts to achieve equal treatment for blacks in the New Deal
programs and the armed services); id. at 447 (describing Eleanor's efforts to persuade the
President to address racial tensions during the war); id. at 626 ("Eleanor Roosevelt's stand
on civil rights, her insistence that America could not fight racism abroad while tolerating it
at home, remains one of the affirming moments in the history of the home front during the
war. Though she was naive about many aspects of the racial problem, she was far ahead of
the president and the times in her understanding that separate but equal facilities were not
enough, that the fact of segregation itself impaired the lives of the Negro population.");
FLEMING, supra note 15, at 100 (describing how Eleanor attempted to sit in the section
reserved for blacks, next to Mary McLeod Bethune, at a meeting of the Southern Conference
for Human Welfare in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1938); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 192 (1963) [hereinafter NEW DEAL] ("An ardent
exponent of Negro rights, the First Lady kept Walter White of the N.A.A.C.P. posted on the
President's views, and on occasion secured him an unusual one hour and twenty minutes'
conference with Roosevelt."). In contrast, the administration of Franklin Roosevelt
produced no significant civil rights legislation. See Peter Irons, New Deal Symposium:
Politics and Principle: An Assessment of the Roosevelt Record on Civil Rights and Liberties,
59 WASH. L. REV. 693 (1984) (criticizing in general Roosevelt's performance on civil rights as
President); id. at 722 ("The 'moral tone' set by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the crucial area of
civil rights and liberties was, regrettably, one more of disdain than determination.").
18. See FLEMING, supra note 15, at 100-101 (displaying Eleanor's letter to the D.A.R.,
which says in part, "I am in complete disagreement with the attitude taken in refusing
Constitution Hall to a great artist. You have set an example which seems to me
unfortunate, and I feel obliged to send in to you my resignation. You had an opportunity to
lead in an enlightened way and it seems to me that your organization has failed.").
19. FLEMING, supra note 15, at 116 (quoting Eleanor, who traveled to California after
Pearl Harbor, stating "Let's be honest. There is a chance now for great hysteria against
minority groups - loyal Americans who have not suddenly ceased to be Americans."); id. at
117 (stating that "Eleanor was enraged by her husband's decision to displace Japanese
Americans," and quoting her as saying, "These people were not convicted of any crime.").
20. See FLEMING, supra note 15, at 123 (describing Eleanor's visits to the Tuskegee
airfield and her correspondence with the airmen, and describing her note to Secretary of
War Henry Stimson as stating, "This seems to me a really crucial situation.").
21. See, e.g., ELEANOR ROOSEVELT, COURAGE IN A DANGEROUS WORLD: THE POLITICAL
WRITINGS OF ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 138-39 (Allida M. Black ed. 1999) ("If I were a Negro
today, I think I would have moments of great bitterness." (quoting Freedom: Promise or
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it was Eleanor, as chair of the United Nations Human Rights Commis-
sion, who oversaw the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
22
It is unnecessary in this article to recount in detail Franklin
Roosevelt's bitter conflict with the Supreme Court:23 the Court's in-
transigence in the face of populist sentiment and progressive
legislation during Roosevelt's first term;24 the presidential election of
1936, construed by many people as a referendum on the decisions of
the Supreme Court;25 Roosevelt's court-packing plan;26 and Roosevelt's
victory over the Court in early 1937, the "switch in time that saved
nine."27 All of these events have been adequately chronicled by other
legal scholars.28 What has not received sufficient emphasis, however,
is the significance of what the Roosevelt Court accomplished after 1937
Fact, Negro Digest, October 1943)); id. at 139-40 "Many a boy, when asked, still says he does
not know what he is fighting for. While he knows we have to beat Hitler and the Japs, he
will be glad when it is done and he is back home again. That would be all right if winning
the war would settle all the racial questions, but it is after the war when we live together
that they will become really important. In addition, if every boy was sure that he would be
going back home again, he could decide later for what objectives he had fought and work for
them, but if he is to die, he must be sure that what he died for is worthwhile to his parents,
his brothers, his sisters, his wife or his sweetheart." (quoting Abolish Jim Crow, New
Threshold, August 1943)).
22. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, THE WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT
AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); see also FLEMING, supra note
15, at 138; Mary Robinson, Making Human Rights Matter: Eleanor Roosevelt's Time Has
Come, 16 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 1 (2003).
23. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 231-38 (describing the Court's decisions
striking down New Deal legislation and Roosevelt's response). See also infra text
accompanying notes 239-50.
24. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 231-33 (summarizing a series of Supreme Court
decisions in 1935 and 1936 striking down important New Deal legislation); WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT 26-51 (1995) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT REBORN] (describing the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Rail Pension case and the reaction of Roosevelt and his
advisors to the decision).
25. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 53 (1991) ("If the American
people were ever endorsing a break with their constitutional past, they were doing so in the
1930's."); William E. Leuchtenberg, When the People Spoke, What Did They Say?: The
Election of 1936 and the Ackerman Thesis, 108 YALE L.J. 2077 (1999) (discussing
Ackerman's thesis).
26. See NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 231-38 (describing Roosevelt's failed attempt to
persuade Congress to allow him to add six additional members to the Supreme Court).
27. See SUPREME COURT REBORN, supra note 24, at 177 (explaining how the defection of
Justice Roberts defeated the court-packing plan); see also NEWMAN, infra note 71, at 214
(attributing the "switch" quip to columnist Joseph Alsop).
28. See generally, CORWIN, supra note 2 (supporting in general the "constitutional
revolution, ltd." of the New Deal era); SUPREME COURT REBORN, supra note 24 (same);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 225-45 (describing same); BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 279-382 (Belknap Press 1998) (critiquing the New Deal transformation);
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and how it laid the groundwork for the achievements of the Warren
Court.29 The purpose of this article is to describe the constitutional
reforms of the Roosevelt Court in the field of human rights, and to re-
but certain criticisms of the Roosevelt Court that have been leveled at
it by Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas.
Part II of this article describes the justices whom Roosevelt ap-
pointed, and analyzes the jurisprudential approach of each of the
leading justices. Part III reviews the fundamental changes that the
Roosevelt Court made in the interpretation of the Constitution in
seven areas of constitutional law. Part IV identifies some attacks that
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have made upon the constitutional
principles that were established by the Roosevelt Court, and answers
those attacks.
II. THE JUSTICES OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT
Between 1937 and 1943 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
appointed eight justices to the Supreme Court, filling seven different
seats.30 Two holdover justices served throughout Roosevelt's tenure:
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, who was generally sympathetic to the New
Deal legislation, 31 and Justice Owen Roberts, a moderate who con-
verted to Roosevelt's understanding of the Constitution after the 1936
Presidential election. 32 Roosevelt's first appointment - Hugo Black -
ascended to the high court in August of 1937, 33 and he cemented the
majority of the Court which would vote to uphold the constitutionality
of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation.34 Thereafter Roosevelt appointed
Stanley Reed,35 Felix Frankfurter, 36 William Douglas, 37 Frank Mur-
Stephen R. Alton, Loyal Lieutenant, Able Advocate: The Role of Robert H. Jackson in
Franklin Roosevelt's Battle with the Supreme Court, 5 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 527 (1997).
29. See supra note 3.
30. See HocKETT, supra note 1, at 2-3 (listing the Roosevelt appointees).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-88 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from decision of Court declaring the federal Agricultural Adjustment Act to be
unconstitutional); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 341 (1936) (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from decision of Court declaring federal Bituminous Coal Act to be
unconstitutional, and indicating that he was joined by Justice Stone).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 248-52 (describing Court's decision in Jones &
Laughlin Steel v. N.L.R.B., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
33. Sworn in August 19, 1937. Oyez: Hugo L. Black, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/hugo lblack/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
34. See infra text accompanying note 250.
35. Sworn in January 31, 1938. Oyez: Stanley Reed, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/stanley-reed/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
36. Sworn in January 30, 1939. Oyez: Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/felix-frankfurter/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
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phy,38 James Byrnes, 39 Robert Jackson, 40 and Wiley Rutledge, 41 who
filled the vacancy that occurred when Justice Byrnes left office in 1942.
Roosevelt also appointed Justice Stone to be Chief Justice in 1941.42
The Roosevelt appointees constituted a majority of the Court until the
death of Justice Robert Jackson in the fall of 1954.4 3 It is thus fair to
say that the Roosevelt Court existed from late 1937 through late
1954, 44 and that the Roosevelt era encompassed decisions from United
States v. Carolene Products (1938) 45 through Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (1954).46 In this sense, Brown represents the overlap between the
Roosevelt Court and the Warren Court.47 Brown was the culmination
of the Roosevelt Revolution, and the commencement of the Warren era.
There are several remarkable features about the justices whom
Roosevelt appointed. All of the Roosevelt appointees had demon-
strated their support for Roosevelt or for his policies. 48 Four of them
37. Sworn in April 17, 1939. Oyez: William 0. Douglas, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/william-o douglas/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
38. Sworn in February 5, 1940. Oyez: Frank Murphy, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/frank-murphy/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
39. Sworn in July 8, 1941. Oyez: James F. Byrnes, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, http:fl
www.oyez.org/justices/james_f byrnes/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
40. Sworn in July 11, 1941. Oyez: Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Supreme Court Justice,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/robert..hjackson/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
41. Sworn in February 15, 1943. Oyez: Wiley B. Rutledge, U.S. Supreme Court
Justice, http:/www.oyez.org/justices/wileyb-rutledge/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
42. Sworn in as Chief Justice July 3, 1941. Oyez: Harlan Fiske Stone, U.S. Supreme
Court Justice, http://www.oyez.org/justices/harlanfiskestone/ (last visited September 17,
2007).
43. At the time of Robert Jackson's death on October 9, 1954, Hugo Black, William
Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, and Stanley Reed still sat upon the Supreme Court. See Oyez:
Robert H. Jackson, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, http://www.oyez.org/justices/robert_h
jackson/ (last visited September 17, 2007).
44. See DOMNARSKi, supra note 1, at 1(identifying the Roosevelt era as starting with
the appointment of Justice Jackson in 1941 and ending with his death in 1954).
45. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
46. 347 U.S. 343 (1954).
47. Earl Warren was sworn in as Chief Justice on October 5, 1953. He presided over
reargument in Brown, and authored the opinion for a unanimous court. Oyez: Earl Warren,
U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice, http://www.oyez.org/justices/earlwarren/ (last visited
September 17, 2007).
48. See NEWMAN, infra note 71, at 207 ("Roosevelt appreciated Black's value to the
party and to liberalism . . . ."); id at 211-19, (describing Hugo Black's support for the
President's court-packing plan and his tireless work to secure the enactment of the Fair
Labor Standards Act); Louis L. Jaffe, Professors and Judges as Advisors to Government:
Reflections on the Roosevelt-Frankfurter Relationship, 83 HARv. L. REV. 366 (1969)
(describing the closeness of the relationship between Frankfurter and Roosevelt); MELVIN I.
UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICLAL RESTRAINT AND INDrIVDUAL LIBERTIEs 44 (1991)
(stating that Frankfurter "certainly enjoyed the friendship and attention of the President,
who discovered in the Court battle that he could count on Frankfurter's loyalty."); JAMEs F.
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(Frankfurter, Douglas, Byrnes, and Jackson) were close and trusted
advisors to the President.49 In addition, most of the appointees had
achieved prominence in public office outside the judiciary.50 Two of the
appointees served as State Governors (Murphy and Byrnes);51 two as
United States Senators (Black and Byrnes);52 two as Attorney General
(Murphy and Jackson);53 two as Solicitor General (Reed and Jack-
son);54 one as Secretary of State (Byrnes);55 one as Chair of the War
Labor Policies Board (Frankfurter);56 and one as Chair of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (Douglas).57 Only two of the Roosevelt
appointees were not serving in elected or appointed political office
when they were nominated for the Supreme Court: Felix Frankfurter5 8
SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 100-101
(1995) (stating that William 0. Douglas' attacks on business "delighted" President
Roosevelt, "who invited Douglas to join both his poker parties and his inner circle of
economic advisors."); HocKETT, supra note 1, at 231-36 (describing Jackson's service as
Solicitor General and Attorney General under Roosevelt); id. at 236-37 (quoting Frankfurter
advising Roosevelt to appoint Stone rather than Jackson as Chief Justice because "Bob is of
your personal and political family, as it were, while Stone is a Republican .... [W]hen war
does come, the country should feel you are a national, the Nation's President, and not a
partisan President."); DAVID G. SAVAGE, 2 GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 996 (4th Ed.
2004) (describing Byrnes' service as "speechwriter and political strategist" and his "loyal
support" of Roosevelt, as well as the fact that after leaving the Court Byrnes "exercised
great power in the administration"); id. at 997 (describing how Rutledge came to Roosevelt's
attention because of his strong support of Roosevelt's court-packing plan); id. at 991
(describing Reed's service as Solicitor General).
49. See id.
50. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character and Experience, 72
BOSTON U. L. REV. 747, 757 (summarizing the political experience of the members of the
United States Supreme Court at the time of Brown, stating that "[elarly in his tenure,
Frankfurter sat on a Court with members who had attained substantial experience on the
national political scene before they were appointed to the Court.").
51. See SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 996.
52. See id. at 990, 995.
53. See id. at 994, 996.
54. See id. at 991, 996.
55. See id. at 995.
56. See id. at 992.
57. See id. at 993.
58. At the time of his appointment, Frankfurter was a highly respected Harvard law
professor. On the other hand, Frankfurter was no stranger to politics. During the early
part of the century he had served in several positions in the federal government, including
Chair of the War Labor Policies Board. See SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 992.
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and Wiley Rutledge.5 9 Rutledge was the only Roosevelt appointee who
had significant prior judicial experience.
60
Another striking characteristic of the Roosevelt Court is that
several of its members had known hardship or had risen from modest
circumstances. William Douglas, Robert Jackson, Hugo Black, and Wi-
ley Rutledge were all born into working class families in poor, rural
communities. 61 Frankfurter immigrated to this country at the age of
12, and grew up in New York's lower east side.62 Byrnes' mother was a
dressmaker in Charleston, South Carolina.63 Wiley Rutledge lost his
mother at age 9,64 William Douglas lost his father at age 6,65 and
James Byrnes' father died before he was born.66
In summary, this was a court of practical men. They had either
exercised political power themselves or they had advised those who
did. They supported the New Deal and they were loyal to Franklin
Roosevelt. Having experienced or witnessed hard times themselves,
59. Like Frankfurter, Rutledge came from academia. As Dean of Iowa Law School,
Rutledge had spoken out in favor of Roosevelt's court-packing plan. In 1939, Roosevelt
appointed Rutledge to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and two years later Rutledge was
elevated to the Supreme Court. See SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 998.
60. See SUPREME COURT REBORN, supra note 24, at 211 (noting that, of the justices who
were sitting on the Supreme Court when Roosevelt became President, only one - Justice
Cardozo -had any prior judicial experience); id. at 212 (noting that Black had briefly served
as a police court magistrate).
61. See HocKETT, supra note 1, at 216-18 (describing Jackson's upbringing near
Jamestown, New York); id., at 219 (Jackson did not attend college, and attended law school
for only one year); id. at 237 (quoting Jackson as saying, "associate justice of the Supreme
Court is a long ways from the farm in Spring Creek"); DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 130
(describing Douglas' poverty as a child, and his struggle with infantile paralysis); WILLIAI
D. PEDERSON & NORMAN W. PROVIZER, GREAT JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
RATINGS & CASE STUDIES 252 (1994) (referring to Black as "the eighth (and last) child of a
small-town rural merchant" and of his "impoverished rural background); HoCKETT, at 73-83
(describing Hugo Black's devotion to yeoman farmers and workingmen of rural Alabama in
his legal and political career); THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES,
1789-1995 411 (Clare Cushman, ed. 1995) (describing Wiley Rutledge's childhood)
[herinafter THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES]; WIECEK, supra note 3, at 72 (stating that Black
was raised in "modest circumstances"); but see DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 100 ("Hugo
Black was raised in relative prosperity made possible by his father's success as a merchant,
amid the county's poverty."); WIECEK, supra note 3, at 94 (stating that Douglas "fabricated
legends about himself. .. ").
62. See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 1 (describing Frankfurter's childhood); WIECEK,
supra note 3, at 84 (stating that Frankfurter spoke no English upon his arrival in America).
63. See SAVAGE, supra note 48, at 996 (describing Rutledge's childhood).
64. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 61, at 411 (death of Rutledge's
mother).
65. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 130 (death of Douglas' father).
66. See Savage, supra note 48, at 996 (death of Byrnes' father); WIECEK, supra note 3,
at 105 (stating that Byrnes' father died shortly after he was born, "leaving his family
impoverished.").
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when they ascended to the Court they did not forget their roots nor did
they abandon those who needed their protection. They were deter-
mined not only to permit the state and federal government to redress
economic injustice,6 7 but they were equally determined to prevent the
state or federal government from imposing racial, religious, or political
injustice.6
8
Based upon the number, scope, and influence of their judicial
opinions in constitutional cases, the leading members of the Roosevelt
Court were Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas, and
Robert Jackson. 69 What is remarkable is that each of these four jus-
tices employed a different approach to interpreting the Constitution.
They embraced profoundly different principles to guide them in the in-
terpretive task, and they disagreed repeatedly - sometimes bitterly -
67. See infra text accompanying notes 139-62, 242-68 (describing Roosevelt Court's
interpretation of Substantive Due Process and Commerce Clause).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 170-296, 309-48 (describing Roosevelt Court's
interpretation of First Amendment, State Action Doctrine, and Equal Protection Clause).
69. See HocKETT, supra note 1, at 4 (identifying Black and Frankfurter as Roosevelt's
"best known justices," and Douglas, Jackson, and Rutledge as "only slightly less
celebrated."). The other four Roosevelt appointees - Stanley Reed, Frank Murphy, James
Byrnes, and Wiley Rutledge - authored relatively few opinions interpreting the
Constitution and are seldom quoted. Their significance lies mainly in the votes that they
cast in support of the opinions authored by other justices of the Roosevelt Court expanding
both the power of Congress and the rights of individuals under the Constitution. One
reason for the relative paucity of constitutional authority emanating from these justices is
that three of them served on the Supreme Court for but a limited time. Justice Byrnes
served only a little over a year on the Supreme Court, leaving no mark on the interpretation
of the Constitution. For an overview of Byrnes' political career, see generally, Peter M.
Fishbein, Book Review, All in One Lifetime, James F. Byrnes, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1193 (1953).
Justice Rutledge was a member of the Court for six years until his death in 1949. His most
significant constitutional opinion is Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), which
recognized the fundamental right of parents to raise their children (now considered to be
one aspect of the right to privacy), but which ruled that the State's interest in regulating
child labor trumped this right. Justice Murphy served on the Supreme Court for only nine
years. He also died in 1949, the year before the Court decided the graduate school
desegregation cases of Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) and McLaurin v. Okla. State
Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). He was passionately committed to civil
rights. See WIECEK, supra note 3, at 99-100 (describing Murphy as "the most outspoken
opponent of racism on the Court before the accession of Justice Thurgood Marshall."); id. at
102 (stating that as Attorney General, Murphy established a Civil Rights Section within the
Department of Justice). Murphy is perhaps best remembered for his dissenting opinion in
Korematsu, where he stated: "This exclusion of'all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien
and non-alien,' from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of
martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over 'the very brink of
constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism." Korematsu v. United States,
23 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Reed, despite his 19-year tenure
on the Supreme Court, created little constitutional precedent. Foremost among his
decisions was Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down the "white primary"
rule). See infra notes 276-280 (discussing Smith).
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over the scope and application of those principles. 70 But what they had
in common was a devotion to basic human rights,71 a devotion which
they shared with both Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt. 72 As a result,
they began in earnest the process of defining the nature and the scope
of our rights under the Constitution, a process which has continued
down to the present day.
Hugo Black was a textualist,73 perhaps the greatest textualist
ever to have graced the Court.74 Black was also a careful constitu-
70. See, e.g., WALLACE MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN
THE COURT 118-131 (1966) (contrasting Justice Frankfurter's judicial restraint with Justice
Black's judicial activism); HocKETr, supra note 1 (describing the different jurisprudential
approaches of Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson); id. at 5 (referring to the "jurisprudential
dissonance of the New Deal Justices"); DOMNARSKI, supra note 1 (contrasting the judicial
philosophies of Black, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Douglas); JAMES F. SIMON, THE
ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN MODERN AMERICA
(1989).
71. See, e.g., ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 210-11 (1994) (quoting
Black, "It is my belief that the part of the Bill of Rights which protects free speech, free
religion, and a free press constitutes the real bulwark of liberty and that a suppression of
these rights would destroy our Nation as a Democracy."); UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 127
(noting that Frankfurter had courageously demanded justice for Tom Mooney and Sacco
and Vanzetti, but that given his philosophy of judicial restraint, "he could do little to fight
the intolerance he saw and despised."); DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 134 ("Douglas did not
arrive at the Court as the great civil libertarian he became."); id. at 162 (stating that
Douglas "either led or followed the Court in the 1960s in its individual rights revolution
. . . ."); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (Jackson, J.)
("The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes
of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.").
72. See infra text accompanying notes 10-22 (setting forth evidence of Franklin's and
Eleanor's commitment to human rights).
73. See HOCKETr, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that Justice Black "maintained that the
only legitimate influences in constitutional adjudication are the document's language and,
where the language is not explicit, the history of the adoption of the provision in question.").
Justice Black's textual approach, tempered by history, may be contrasted to the "new
textualism" approach of Justice Antonin Scalia, who has resorted to dictionaries instead of
legislative history in the interpretation of statutes. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms,
Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 671 (1999);
Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 621, 623 (1990) (describing Justice
Scalia's approach as "an uncompromising application of statutory plain meaning"); WILSON
R. HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 13 (2002) (describing Justice Scalia's
interpretative approach to statutory interpretation).
74. See HOCKETT, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that many legal scholars regard Justice
Black as one of the "greatest" justices, and noting that others consider him to be "absurd" or
"irresponsible.").
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tional historian, 75 but in case after case, Black looked to the language
of the Constitution for ultimate guidance to its meaning. For example,
in the arena of the freedom of expression, where Justice Black is per-
haps best known, he was a First Amendment absolutist.76 Black
consistently took the position that obscenity laws are unconstitutional,
because the First Amendment says that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .,77 However,
Black's faithfulness to literal constitutional text cut both ways. In
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,78 Justice Black con-
tended that a high school student did not have a constitutional right to
wear a black armband in protest of the Vietnam War, because, he said,
"While I have always believed that under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments neither the State nor the Federal Government has any
authority to regulate or censor the content of speech, I have never be-
lieved that any person has a right to give speeches or engage in
demonstrations where he pleased and when he pleases."79 Justice
Black also misconstrued the plain language of the Ninth amendment,
which essentially provides that the people have constitutional rights
that are not enumerated in the Bill of Rights.80 In my opinion, Justice
Black simply could not admit the possibility that in order to identify all
of our fundamental rights, it is sometimes necessary to resort to non-
textual methods of interpreting the Constitution.8'
Before his appointment to the Supreme Court, Felix Frank-
furter had courageously fought to obtain justice for the embattled labor
75. See supra note 71; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (containing an exhaustive appendix of historical evidence regarding the intent of
the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993) (hereinafter On
Misreading John Bingham) (supporting Justice Black's reading of the historical evidence);
NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 405 (stating that Black "had digested [the framers'] debates and
could practically regurgitate them whole.").
76. See NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 513 (quoting Justice Black as stating that under the
First Amendment "there should be no libel or defamation law in the United States under
the United States Government, just absolutely none as far as I am concerned.").
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
78. 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding right of a public school student to wear a black
armband in opposition to the Vietnam War).
79. Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Newman, supra note 71, at 592 (stating
that Black's fellow justices "were in various stages of shock as [Black] delivered his
blistering dissent from the bench" in Tinker.).
80. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
81. See NEWMAN, supra note 71, at 593 (stating that Hugo Black's textualism led him
to view the First Amendment "as if it were a literal Gospel instead of a living charter for a
society full of contradictions. . . .This fundamentalism cramped his approach toward
individual rights.").
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leader Tom Mooney and the accused anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti,
8 2
but his human rights record on the Court was ultimately unsatisfac-
tory. Justice Frankfurter frequently found reason not to decide a case
on the merits,8 3 and even when he did consider the merits of a cause,
his reliance upon "history" made it unnecessary for him to evaluate the
more difficult aspects of constitutional adjudication.8 4 Justice Frank-
furter recognized that difficult constitutional cases represent a clash of
principles,8 5 but he himself often shrank from the task of balancing one
principle against another. Frankfurter sometimes cited federalism
concerns8 6 or the necessity to conserve judicial resources8 7 as reasons
for judicial restraint, but he also expressed the idea that judicial re-
82. See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 11-12 (describing Frankfurter's efforts on Mooney's
behalf as counsel to the Mediation Commission); id. at 22-25 (describing Frankfurter's
efforts on behalf of Sacco and Vanzetti).
83. See PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTITUTION 5-38
(1971) (describing Frankfurter's philosophy of judicial restraint). Kurland describes the
welter of objections that Frankfurter raised to the exercise of constitutional oversight in a
number of cases, including Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943) (objecting to the use of an
extraordinary writ to confer jurisdiction upon the Court); Irwin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394
(1959) (whether the decision below actually turned upon a question of federal law); Burns v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (invoking the final judgment rule and stating "[iut is the special
obligation of this Court strictly to observe the limits of its jurisdiction."); and Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961) (ripeness). See also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that the defendant had waived any constitutional
error by failing to object to the jury instructions, stating that "[wie have no authority to
meddle with such a judgment unless some claim under the Constitution or the laws of the
United States has been made before the State court whose judgment we are reviewing and
unless the claim has been denied by that court.").
84. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(contending that legislative malapportionment problems are nonjusticiable "political
questions," and that the decision of the majority to the contrary and finding the matter to be
governed by Equal Protection principles "cast[s] aside ... the . . . uniform course of our
political history regarding the relationship between population and legislative
representation . . . ."); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940)
(Frankfurter, J.) ("Deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy .. . are
often tougher and truer law than the dead words of the written text."); see also KURLAND,
supra note 83, at 5 (identifying "history and the obligation that constitutionalism imposes to
adhere to the essential meaning put in the document by its framers" as the first of several
considerations that drove Frankfurter's philosophy of judicial restraint).
85. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAw AND MEN 43 (1956) ("[T]here is hardly a question
of real difficulty before the Court that does not entail more than one so-called principle.").
86. See, e.g., Adamson, 332 U.S. at 64-65 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Indeed, the
suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the first eight Amendments as
such is not unambiguously urged. Even the boldest innovator would shrink from suggesting
to more than half the States that they may no longer initiate prosecutions without
indictment by grand jury, or that thereafter all the States of the Union must furnish a jury
of 12 for every case involving a claim above $20.").
87. Ex Parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The tremendous and
delicate problems which call for the judgment of the nation's ultimate tribunal require the
utmost conservation of time and energy even for the ablest judges.").
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straint is necessary because judicial intervention in political conflicts
"may well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ of 'the Su-
preme Law of the Land' . .*.."88 Frankfurter considered judicial
restraint to be not just fundamental, but rather "the most fundamental
principle of constitutional adjudication." 9 Philip Kurland has ob-
served that some of Frankfurter's justifications for judicial self-
restraint "were dear to him but somewhat elusive for many others."90
A contemporary commentator, Edward Corwin, referring to Frank-
furter's opinion in Gobitis deferring to the decision of a local school
board to suspend schoolchildren for refusing to salute the flag, said:
"even more distasteful than the ruling itself is Justice Frankfurter's
smug assumption that the Court is the happy possessor of a patent
formula which enables it in cases like this to dispense with exercising
its own judgment."91
William 0. Douglas was the polar opposite of Frankfurter in his
approach to deciding constitutional cases. Where Frankfurter was
timid in his reading of the Constitution, Douglas was bold, both as to
substance and as to style. With his decisions in Skinner v. Oklahoma9
2
and Griswold v. Connecticut93 Justice Douglas must be considered the
seminal author of the constitutional "Right to Privacy."94 Although
Justice Douglas had, like Justice Black, employed a literal interpretive
approach to First Amendment problems, 95 in Griswold Justice Douglas
parted ways with Justice Black and read the Bill of Rights broadly,
88. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
89. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 323 (1946) ("[Tlhe most fundamental principle of
constitutional adjudication is not to face constitutional questions, if it is at all possible to
avoid them."); see also infra note 137 (describing James Bradley Thayer's judicial
philosophy and Frankfurter's adherence to it).
90. See KURLAND, supra note 83, at 8.
91. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 112.
92. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down state law permitting sterilization of repeat
felons).
93. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state law that prohibited the use of
contraception).
94. See SIMON, supra note 48, at 101 (observing that Douglas had recognized the right
to procreate and the right to be let alone decades before the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade).
95. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 511-12 (1957) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (Douglas, joined by Justice Black, would have declared an obscenity statute to
be unconstitutional because "The standard of what offends 'the common conscience of the
community' conflicts, in my judgment, with the command of the First Amendment that
'Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.'"); id. at
514 ("The First Amendment, its prohibition in terms absolute, was designed to preclude
courts as well as legislatures from weighing the values of speech against silence. The First
Amendment puts free speech in the preferred position. Freedom of expression can be
suppressed if, and to the extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an
inseparable part of it.").
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finding that the "penumbra" emanating from the specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights implies a general "right to privacy."96 Nor did Justice
Douglas confine himself to the issues under consideration in any par-
ticular case. In a difficult case involving the standing of the plaintiffs
to bring challenges under the environmental protection laws, Douglas
evocatively argued on behalf of vesting legal rights in rivers and
trees.97 In another troublesome case involving the First Amendment
rights of an individual who had burned his draft card, Douglas pre-
ferred to consider whether or not it was constitutional to draft soldiers
to fight in an undeclared war.98 Despite the greatness of his vision and
his contributions to the Right to Privacy, Justice Douglas' lack of disci-
pline diminishes the value of his jurisprudence. He was often
inspiring, but because he demonstrated so little regard for existing le-
gal doctrine and the customary norms of legal reasoning, he was
frequently unable to erect a solid foundation for the future develop-
ment of the law.99
In my opinion, the most influential of all of the Roosevelt ap-
pointees is Robert H. Jackson. In the elegance of his prose, the only
96. 381 U.S. at 484 (Douglas, J.) ("[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance."); id. at 485 (Douglas, J.) ("[Tihe right of privacy which presses for recognition
here is a legitimate one."); id. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting) (reiterating his position that
the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the provisions of the Bill of Rights and no other
rights).
97. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 707, 743 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). After
observing that corporations may sue and be sued, Justice Douglas stated: "So it should be as
respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees,
swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modem technology and
modern life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or
nourishes - fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other
animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or
its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it. Those
people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water - whether it be a fisherman, a
canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger - must be able to speak for the values which the river
represents and which are threatened with destruction." Id. at 743 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
98. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 389 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The
underlying and basic problem in this case, however, is whether conscription is permissible
in the absence of a declaration of war. That question has not been briefed nor was it
presented in oral argument; but it is, I submit, a question upon which the litigants and the
country are entitled to a ruling.").
99. See WIECEK, supra note 3, at 93 (stating that Douglas "left no coherent doctrinal
legacy"); SIMON, supra note 48, at 101 (describing Douglas as "a loner" and stating that he
was "capable of producing shafts of stark constitutional insight but more often satisfied with
idiosyncratic positions calculated to appeal to not a single colleague."); but see DOMNARSKI,
supra note 1, at 129 (stating that Douglas, unlike Black, Frankfurter, and Jackson, "did not,
as they did, indulge the pettiness of personality" in his work on the Court); id at 164 (stating
that "Douglas' values have been the values that have distinguished the court and the
nation.").
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20th century judges who can be compared to Robert Jackson are Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis,10 0 and the only judge who
matches Jackson in the intricacy of his thought is Benjamin Nathan
Cardozo. 10 However, Holmes and Brandeis are famous mainly for
their dissents, 0 2 while Cardozo served only 6 years on the Supreme
Court of the United States 0 3 and authored a bare handful of well-
known opinions interpreting the Constitution.10 4 In contrast, Robert
Jackson was a member of the Court for 13 years, and Roosevelt appoin-
100. See DOMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that Jackson was "after Holmes,
perhaps the finest writer ever to sit on the Court."); id. at 42 ("At its best, Jackson's prose
gives life to the language of the law and shows it not as a distinct branch of learning or
science but as life in its essence. He achieved an immediacy with the language of his
opinions that has not been equaled by anyone sitting on the Court.").
101. See BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921)
(setting forth a complex and elegant theory of judicial decisionmaking); Michael Bernick,
Benjamin Cardozo: A Judge Most Eminent, in THE SUPREME COURT AND ITS JUSTICES 149-55
(Jesse H. Choper, ed. 2001) (summarizing Cardozo's career and judicial philosophy);
WIECEK, supra note 3, at 109 (stating "Jackson was, bar none, the finest literary craftsman
to have served on the Court since Cardozo." ).
102. See Lochner v. New York, 195 U.S. 45, 65-74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(opposing principle of economic substantive due process); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (supporting principle of freedom of expression);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (same); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (supporting principle of
freedom of expression); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280-311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (opposing economic substantive due process); id. at 311 ("[A]
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at
471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting) (opposing wiretapping on 4th Amendment grounds);
id. at 478 (referring to "the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.").
103. See Oyez: Benjamin N. Cardozo, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, http://www.oyez.org
justices/benjamin n cardozo.
104. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (Cardozo, J.) (using
dormant commerce clause analysis to strike down state law setting minimum prices to be
paid to out-of-state milk producers); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (Cardozo, J.)
(setting forth theory of selective incorporation of provisions of Bill of Rights into Due
Process Clause of 14th Amendment); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 551-55 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (rejecting distinction between "direct" and
"indirect" effects on interstate commerce, and arguing that the constitutionality of
Congressional measures under the Commerce Clause depended upon the degree to which
the activity being regulated has an effect on commerce); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding Social Security tax); PEDERSON & PROVIZER, supra note 61, at
165 (stating that Cardozo's Supreme Court opinions are cited less frequently than those of
the average justice, but that when his state court opinions are considered, he "rises to
dominance" in numbers of citations; id. (stating that "considering that Cardozo was a junior
justice and served only six years, and that he was one of the so-called liberal 'pariah group'
of justices, his continued popularity ... is phenomenal.").
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tees held sway for that entire period. 10 5 If Holmes, Brandeis, and
Cardozo had come to the Court a generation later, they might have
been the authors of the human rights revolution in the interpretation
of the Constitution. But this great task fell instead to Robert Jackson,
and he proved himself to be equal to it.
Jackson had been a successful trial lawyer,10 6 and his judicial
opinions are phrased not as cold, technical dissections of the law, but
rather as if they were closing arguments.1°7 Above all, Jackson was
persuasive. His forensic skill as well as his commitment to human
rights earned Jackson the opportunity to serve as the United States'
lead counsel at the Nuremburg trials in 1945 to 1946, where he per-
formed brilliantly.
08
Jackson's trademark, and his chief contribution to our under-
standing of the Constitution, was that he would identify the purpose of
a constitutional provision and then apply this insight to deciding the
105. See supra text accompanying notes 30-43; DOMNARSKi, supra note 1, at 1 (noting
that Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson served together from 1941-1954).
106. See HocKET, supra note 1, at 220-21 (describing how Jackson built "a very
successful and diverse practice" as a "country lawyer.").
107. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (Jackson, J.). In
the course of his opinion striking down a state law that interferes with interstate commerce
Justice Jackson makes a number of wonderfully eloquent arguments based upon the
purpose and intent of the Commerce Clause. Jackson commences his peroration by
referring to "This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut
of powers necessary to control of the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs
barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable
economic units," id. at 537-38, and he closes it by stating: "[o]ur system, fostered by the
Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce
by the certainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home
embargoes will withhold his export, and no foreign state will by customs duties or
regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from
every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the
vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality."
Id. at 539 (Jackson, J.).
108. See Brady 0. Bryson, Remembering Robert H. Jackson at Nuremberg Decades Ago,
68 ALB. L. REV. 9, 10 (2004) (author, a member of Jackson's legal team, recalled that
Jackson was "always organized, always busy, always working, always confident, always in
charge and inspirational."); Benjamin B. Ferencz, Tribute to Nuremberg Prosecutor Jackson,
16 PACE INT'L L. REV. 365 (2004). The author states: "Iwihat was done at the Nuremberg
trials between 1945 and 1949 was not 'victors' justice' but a determined effort, led by the
United States, and inspired by Jackson's rhetoric and logic to create a world order governed
by law rather than violence. His colleague and successor for twelve subsequent trials at
Nuremberg, Telford Taylor, wrote, 'Jackson worked and wrote with deep passion and spoke
in winged words. There was no one else who could have done half as well as he.' In addition
to clarifying the scope of Crimes Against Humanity, Robert H. Jackson's greatest
contribution at Nuremberg was outlawing the crime of aggression. In his final report to
President Truman, Jackson expressed the belief of all those who shared in the work of the
IMT that 'at long last the law is now unequivocal in classifying armed aggression as an
international crime instead of a national right.'" Id. at 369.
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case before him. Jackson captured our constitutional ideals so accu-
rately, and his phrasing is so eloquent, that his opinions are frequently
quoted. A few familiar selections from Justice Jackson's opinions
demonstrate the power of his reasoning:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now oc-
cur to us.
10 9
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for
deporting and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But
a judicial construction of the due process clause that will sustain
this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation
of the order itself.110
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget to-
day, that there is no more effective practical guaranty against
arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must
be imposed generally.111
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer
and every craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the cer-
tainty that he will have free access to every market in the Nation,
that no home embargoes will withhold his export, and no foreign
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise,
every consumer may look to the free competition from every produc-
ing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any.
Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of
this Court which has given it reality.
112
One case - Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer'1 3 - vividly
demonstrates the differences between the competing juristic styles of
Justice Black, Justice Frankfurter, and Justice Jackson. All three of
those justices agreed as to the result in Youngstown Sheet & Tube -
they all concluded that President Truman lacked the power, under the
Constitution, to seize the Nation's steel mills in order to prevent a
work stoppage during the Korean War. 1 4 However, they each reached
this conclusion in characteristically different ways.
109. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J.).
110. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 245-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
111. Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
112. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 539 (Jackson, J.).
113. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down President's executive order seizing control of
the steel industry during Korean War as violation of the Separation of Powers).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 113-30.
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Justice Black approached the problem from a textual stand-
point. The power of the President, he said, must be derived either from
the language of a statute or from the language of the Constitution.
1 15
The President had conceded that no statute conferred upon him the
authority to seize control of the steel mills, 116 and as a result, the
power of the President to take control of the steel industry must be
found in the Constitution or not at all.1 17 President Truman argued
that that this power could be derived from the provisions of the Consti-
tution that vest the executive power in the President, that make the
President the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, or that de-
volve upon the President the duty to faithfully execute the laws.11-8
However, after analyzing each of these constitutional provisions, Jus-
tice Black concluded that none of them could be interpreted to confer
this power upon the President.1 1 9 Wielding yet another textual argu-
ment, Justice Black argued that the President's adoption of the seizure
policy was essentially a legislative act, not an executive act, and accord-
ingly only the Congress, not the President, had the authority under the
Constitution to adopt this policy.
1 20
Justice Frankfurter looked primarily to the history of this coun-
try for guidance in resolving this case. He stated:
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government can-
not supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning
to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow
conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words
of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written
upon them. In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to up-
hold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power
part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss
on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of Art. 11.121
115. See id. at 585 (Black, J.) ("The President's power, if any, to issue the order must
stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.").
116. See id. (Black, J.) ("[Wie do not understand the Government to rely on statutory
authorization for this seizure.").
117. See id. at 587 (Black, J.) ("It is clear that if the President had authority to issue the
order he did, it must be found in some provisions of the Constitution.").
118. See id. at 587 (Black, J.) (citing President's reliance upon the relevant provisions
from U.S. CONST., art. II, sec. 1, sec. 2, and sec. 3).
119. See id. at 587-89 (Black, J.) (rejecting President's assertion of authority to seize
steel industry under various provisions of Article II).
120. See id. at 588 (Black, J.) ("The Constitution did not subject this law-making power
of Congress to presidential or military supervision or control.").
121. Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Frankfurter then reviewed how various Presidents had acted in
previous times of crisis, and found no historical precedent that rose to
the level of Truman's actions.
122
Justice Jackson commenced his concurring opinion in Youngs-
town by rejecting the methods of analysis that his colleagues had
utilized. 123 He found the text of the Constitution too vague, the judi-
cial precedents too narrow, the intent of the framers lost to history,
and the various constitutional traditions too varied and too contradic-
tory to be of any practical assistance in guiding the Court to a
resolution of this case. 124 So Jackson turned to first principles, as he so
often did. In this case Jackson identified the purposes of the doctrine
of Separation of Powers1 25 and he outlined a framework for resolving
difficult disputes in this area of constitutional law.1 26 At the heart of
his opinion is the famous "tripartite approach" identifying three con-
texts in which the power of the President to act might arise - when
Congress has given the President authority to act, when Congress has
been silent, and when Congress has withheld from the President the
power to perform the action in question. 27 Justice Jackson concludes
122. See id. at 611-13 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that before World War II
"the record is barren of instances comparable to the one before us," and that the three
instances of Presidential seizures during World War II "do not add up, either in number,
scope, duration or contemporaneous legal justification, to the kind of executive construction
of the Constitution" that would justify the seizure of the steel industry in the case under
consideration).
123. See id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("A judge, like an executive adviser, may be
surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applicable to concrete
problems of executive power as they actually present themselves.").
124. See id. at 634-35 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson stated that "U]ust what
our forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions,
must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called upon
to interpret for Pharaoh. A century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation
yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from respected sources on
each side of any question. They largely cancel each other. And court decisions are indecisive
because of the judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow
way. The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to
judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even
single Articles torn from context." Id. (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
125. See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the
better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.").
126. See id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring) (setting forth what Justice Jackson
describes as "a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a
President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers . ..").
127. See id. (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing three different situations where the
President "acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress," where the
President "acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority," and where
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that, in this case, the Congress had deliberately withheld from the
President the power to seize property under the circumstances of the
case, 128 and that accordingly the President's power was at its "lowest
ebb. 1 29 In the course of his opinion rebuffing the President's claim
that seizure of the steel industry was a military necessity, Jackson re-
minds us that while the Constitution invests the President with the
title of Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, it does not make
him the Commander-in-Chief of the entire country.1 30 Jackson closes
his opinion with an impassioned appeal to the principle of the Rule of
Law, 13 in which he echoed what he had said in his opening statement
at Nuremburg in calling for international law to hold national leaders
accountable for waging aggressive war.132
the President "takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress").
128. See id. at 638-40 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("This leaves the current seizure to be
justified only by the severe tests under the third grouping, where it can be supported only
by any remainder of executive power after subtraction of such powers as Congress may have
over the subject.").
129. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter.").
130. See id. at 643-44 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Constitution did not contemplate
that the title Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also
Commander-in-Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants.").
131. See id. at 654-55 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The essence of our free Government is
'leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the law' - to be governed by those impersonal
forces which we call law. Our Government is fashioned to fulfill this concept so far as
humanly possible. The Executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative
power. The executive action we have here originates in the individual will of the President
and represents an exercise of authority without law. No one, perhaps not even the
President, knows the limits of the power he may seek to exert in this instance and the
parties affected cannot learn the limit of their rights. We do not know today what powers
over labor or property would be claimed to flow from Government possession if we should
legalize it, what rights to compensation would be claimed or recognized, or on what
contingency it would end. With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have
discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be
under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations. Such institutions
may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give
them up.").
132. See Justice Robert H. Jackson, Opening Statement Before the International
Military Tribunal, November 21, 1945, available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/Man/
theman2-7-8-1/. Jackson closed with these words: "[civilization asks whether law is so
laggard as to be utterly helpless to deal with crimes of this magnitude by criminals of this
order of importance. It does not expect that you can make war impossible. It does expect
that your juridical action will put the forces of international law, its precepts, its
prohibitions and, most of all, its sanctions, on the side of peace, so that men and women of
good will, in all countries, may have 'leave to live by no man's leave, underneath the law.'"
Id.
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The judicial opinions of Frankfurter, Black, and Jackson betray
a lack of collegiality among them that legal scholars and biographers
have confirmed. 133 Perhaps one source of the friction among them was
the fact that each of them had a fundamentally different approach to
constitutional interpretation.1 3 4 Black (the textualist), Frankfurter
(the traditionalist) and Jackson (the realist) each considered a differ-
ent source of constitutional law to be the authoritative method of
interpreting the Constitution.135 It is a shame that each did not have
more appreciation for the intellectual and moral strength of the others.
They were engaged in a common enterprise, and together or in tandem
they made invaluable contributions to our society. The accomplish-
ments of the Roosevelt Court are described in the following section.
III. THE DECISIONS OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT
The Roosevelt Court made substantial contributions to the in-
terpretation of the Constitution in at least seven different categories of
constitutional law: Substantive Due Process, Freedom of Expression,
Freedom of Religion, the Commerce Clause, State Action, Separation of
Powers, and Equal Protection. The Court's decisions during this era on
each of these topics are discussed below.
133. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 19 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) (Jackson implicitly accuses the majority of hypocrisy for "advocating a complete
and uncompromising separation of church and state" while permitting public funds to be
used to pay for children to be bused to parochial schools, and stating: "The case which
irresistibly comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to
Byron's reports, 'whispering 'I will ne'er consent,' - consented.'"); UROFSKY, supra note 48, at
50 (stating that "Frankfurter's behavior . . . poisoned the well of collegiality."); id. at 62
(accusing Frankfurter of being "duplicitous and conniving" and of "intellectual arrogance"
and "nastiness."); id. at 85 (describing how Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion,
embarrassed Justice Black by quoting statements that Black had made as a Senator); id. at
86 (describing how Jackson issued an opinion which implicitly accused Justice Black of
impropriety for failing to recuse himself in a case); id. at 87 (describing how Justices Black
and Douglas refused to sign a letter from the Justices praising Justice Roberts at the time of
his retirement, with the result that no letter was sent); SIMON, supra note 48, at 101
(stating that Frankfurter "loathed . . . [Douglas'] person every bit as much as his
philosophy"); id. (stating that Brennan "voted with Douglas regularly but seethed privately
over Douglas's lack of consideration for his colleagues."); DoMNASRI, supra note 1, at 19
(referring to Jackson as a "tragic figure" who "struggled with the demons of his ambition,
jealousy, and resentment"); id. at 50 (referring to "Jackson's hatred of Douglas and
especially Black.").
134. See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 50 (citing "philosophical factionalization of the
Court" as one divisive factor).
135. See generally HocKErr, supra note 1 (contrasting the "antihierarchical"
jurisprudence of Justice Black, the "passive" jurisprudence of Justice Frankfurter, and the
"pragmatic" jurisprudence of Justice Jackson).
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A. Substantive Due Process
The doctrine of Substantive Due Process prevents the govern-
ment from violating the fundamental rights of Americans. 136 The
greatest achievement of the Roosevelt Court in the area of Substantive
Due Process was a jurisprudential innovation: the Court adopted a
stricter standard to evaluate the constitutionality of laws that infringe
upon fundamental rights. Before 1937, the Due Process Clause tested
the constitutionality of all laws by asking whether or not the laws were
"reasonable."137 The Roosevelt Court decided that laws that burden
constitutional rights must meet a higher standard - the "strict scrutiny
test."i 3
8
136. Substantive Due Process is an oxymoron of the law. The Due Process Clauses of
the 5th and 14th Amendments literally establish procedural, not substantive rights. That
is, under each provision the government may not deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without "due process of law," thus implying that life, liberty or property may be
taken away so long as proper procedures are observed. The doctrine of Substantive Due
Process, in contrast, is the concept that certain rights are so basic, so fundamental, that the
government may not interfere with them no matter how much "due process" is provided to
the individual. This doctrine is the rough equivalent of the "human rights" acknowledged
by the United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the "inalienable
rights" referred to in the Declaration of Independence. How the doctrine of substantive
"fundamental rights" found a home in the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th
Amendment is an accident of history, owing to the fact that shortly after the 14th
Amendment was adopted, the Supreme Court eviscerated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the 14th Amendment. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (severely
constricting the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment);
Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 627 (1994) (criticizing
the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Slaughterhouse); Richard L. Aynes, Charles
Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 CHi-KNT L. REV. 1197
(1995) (criticizing Justice Frankfurter's approach to the incorporation of fundamental rights
into the Due Process Clause); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993) (supporting the views of John Bingham,
principal author of the 14th Amendment, that the Amendment would make the Bill of
Rights effective against the States).
137. See, e.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 (Peckham, J.) ("In every case that comes before
this court, therefore, where legislation of this character is concerned, and where the
protection of the Federal Constitution is sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a
fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power of the state, or is it an
unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his
personal liberty, or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him
appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family?"); see also MARK
SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAiTHS: FELIX FRANKFURTER, HuGo BLACK, AND THE PROCESS
OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 38 (1984) (citing James Bradley Thayer as the "foremost
academic spokesman" for the proposition that courts should defer to all legislative
judgments that are "not open to rational question."); see UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 31
(quoting Frankfurter as stating that Thayer's approach "is for me the Alpha and Omega of
our job.").
138. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61.
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The Roosevelt Court also made a radical change in the nature of
the rights that are considered to be fundamental. Prior to 1937 the
Supreme Court had considered one particular constitutional right
above all others to be worthy of protection - the right to property.
Eighty years previously, in the Dred Scott 139 case, the Supreme Court
declared that the property interest of slaveholders in their slaves de-
served constitutional protection. °40 After the civil war, the Supreme
Court turned Adam Smith's economic philosophy of laissez faire capi-
talism into constitutional doctrine, ruling that businesses are
constitutionally entitled to freedom from governmental regulation,' 4 ' a
doctrine which came to be known as "economic substantive due pro-
cess."1 42 In dozens of cases over a period of fifty years from 1887 to
1937, the Supreme Court wielded this doctrine of economic substantive
due process to invalidate laws protecting workers. 4 3 During this pe-
riod minimum wage and maximum hours laws, collective bargaining
laws, and other laws protecting workers were declared unconstitu-
tional on the ground that these laws deprived corporations of their
right to "liberty of contract" that the Court considered to be guaranteed
139. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (striking down the Missouri Compromise
of 1820 on the ground that the law violated the rights of slaveholders).
140. See id. at 451-52 (Taney, C.J.). Chief Justice Taney stated that "the right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to
traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the
citizens of the United States, in every State that might desire it, for twenty years. And the
Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time, if the slave escapes
from his owner. This is done in plain words too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can
be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or
which entitles property of that kind to less protection that property of any other description.
The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the
owner in his rights." Id. (Taney, C.J.)
141. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 23 (1915) (striking down state law
forbidding employers from firing employees for joining a union, and stating that "[aMny act of
the legislature that would undertake to impose on an employer the obligation of keeping in
his service one whom, for any reason, he should not desire, would be a denial of his
constitutional right to make and terminate contracts and to acquire and hold property.").
142. See Martin A. Schwartz, The Supreme Court and Local Gov't Law: The 1999-2000
Term: Due Process and Fundamental Rights 17 ToURo L. REV. 237 (2000). Professor
Schwartz states that "[s]ubstantive due process has always been a very contentious doctrine
in the history of constitutional law. The first case that dealt with substantive due process
was the Dred Scott case, in which the Supreme Court said that slave owners had a
substantive due process right to possess slaves. Then, after Dred Scott, the Supreme Court,
during the discredited Lochner era, created economic substantive due process rights." Id.
143. See, e.g., Lochner, 195 U.S. 45; Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking
down a federal law that prohibited employers from terminating employees if they joined a
labor union, on the ground that the law violated the Due Process Clause of the 5th
Amendment); Coppage, 263 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a similar State law under the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)
(striking down federal minimum wage law).
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under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 1
44
Before 1937, the only other substantive due process right that
the Court had acknowledged was the right of parents to direct the edu-
cation of their children, in the cases of Meyer v. Nebraska145 and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters.146 However, in Buck v. Bell (1927)147 the Supreme
Court upheld a Virginia statute which provided for the sterilization of
persons with mental disabilities, and it refused to protect the right of a
woman not to be sterilized against her will pursuant to this law.148
Furthermore, before the Roosevelt appointees ascended to the Su-
preme Court, the Court had given short shrift to the rights that are
specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Freedom of Religion had been ignored, 149 Equal Protection had
been trampled upon, 150 and the Court had only just begun to protect
Freedom of Expression.' 5 '
All of this changed after 1937. First of all, even before any of
the Roosevelt appointees took office, Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes and Justice Roberts, the two moderates on the Court, joined
forces with the three liberal members and declared "liberty of contract"
to be a dead letter. 152 This may have been a reaction to President
Roosevelt's landslide victory in the 1936 Presidential election where
the Supreme Court was an issue, or it may simply have been a princi-
pled result reached after long study and repeated consideration. 53 In
144. See id.; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870-1960 33 (1992) (stating that during the Lochner era the Supreme Court had elevated
"freedom of contract to the level of a sacred constitutional principle . . ").
145. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down State law that prohibited the public schools
from teaching children any foreign language before the 8th grade).
146. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down State law that prohibited parents from sending
children under the age of 16 to any private or parochial school).
147. 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding state sterilization statute).
148. See id. at 208 (Holmes, J.) (upholding sterilization statute against Carrie Buck's
challenge to the law under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution); id. at 207 ("Three generations of imbeciles are enough."); see also Paul A.
Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
30 (1985) (describing how Carrie Buck was betrayed by her lawyer and railroaded into
undergoing the sterilization procedure).
149. See infra text accompanying notes 223-25.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 309-12
151. See infra text accompanying notes 170-83.
152. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391(1937) (Hughes, C.J.) ("In each
case the violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for women is
deprivation of freedom of contract. What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak
of freedom of contract.").
153. A contemporary commentator expressed both views. Compare CORWIN, supra note
2, at 73 (stating "considerably more important, I surmise, in inducing the Justices - or
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any event, the Supreme Court later unanimously reaffirmed the prin-
ciple that the Due Process Clause does not prohibit the government
from regulating business.
154
However, in 1938 Justice Stone signaled that although "liberty
of contract" had met its demise, the principle of "substantive due pro-
cess" yet survived. In his famous footnote 4 in the Carolene
Products55 case, Justice Stone noted that although the business regu-
lation that was at issue in the case would be upheld so long as there
was a "rational basis" for the law, 156 there would be a "narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality" and "a more
searching judicial inquiry" when fundamental rights were at stake -
such as the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, political rights, or
the rights of minority groups.
157
certain of them - to restudy their position, than the Court proposal or the homily which was
its prologue, was the outcome of the election of 1936, manifesting overwhelming popular
approval of the New Deal ...."), with id. at 76 ("Justice Stone's relentless insistence in
argument, the Chief Justice's political skill, and Justice Roberts's eagerness for the light -
these were the chief intracurial factors in bringing about the Court's reversal of position on
the New Deal.").
154. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (Black, J.) ("The doctrine
that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and like cases - that due process
authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted
unwisely - has long since been discarded.").
155. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (upholding the Federal Filled Milk Act against a
Due Process challenge).
156. See id. at 152 (Stone, J.) ("[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial
transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.").
157. See id. at 152 n.4. The Court stated that "[t]here may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. It is
unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. Nor need we enquire
whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular
religious, or national, or racial minorities; whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Id. (Stone, J.). See also WIECEK, supra
note 3, at 116-42 (discussing the significance of footnote 4); see also CORWIN, supra note 2, at
111-12 (approving relatively recent rulings of the Supreme Court incorporating freedom of
speech and press and the right to fair trial into the Due Process Clause.); id. at 115 ("[Tlhe
Court has, in the very act of retiring from the field of economic policy, manifested an
increased concern to protect against hasty and prejudiced legislation the citizen's freedom to
express his views .....").
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Four years later, in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,158
the Supreme Court fulfilled Justice Stone's prediction and for the first
time employed its newly-crafted theory that imposes a stricter stan-
dard of review upon laws that infringe constitutional rights. Writing
for a unanimous court, Justice Douglas ruled that the right of procrea-
tion is a "fundamental" right,159 and that laws that infringe upon
fundamental rights are subject to "strict scrutiny."160 This decision
created two lines of analysis in constitutional cases - strict scrutiny for
laws affecting fundamental rights, and rational basis for laws which do
not affect fundamental rights - an approach which has dominated the
Court's constitutional jurisprudence down to the present day.' 6 '
Skinner is also a principal decision of the Supreme Court pro-
tecting the "right to privacy," although the Roosevelt Court did not use
that term. Procreation is not mentioned in the Bill of Rights, yet Jus-
tice Douglas reasoned that it is a fundamental right because of its
profound importance to society and in the life of the individual. Justice
Douglas stated:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may
have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless
hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the domi-
nant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for the
individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State
conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a ba-
sic liberty.
16 2
158. 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (striking down state law which allowed the sterilization of
"habitual criminals.").
159. See id. at 541 (Douglas, J.) ("Ve are dealing here with legislation which involves
one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race.").
160. See id. (Douglas, J.) ("[S]trict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes in a
sterilization law is essential.").
161. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 542 U.S. 656, 665-66, 673 (2004) (using strict
scrutiny analysis to uphold preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Child Online
Protection Act). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 538, 577 (2003) (striking down state
law prohibiting sodomy on ground that law was not supported by a sufficient governmental
interest); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., plurality opinion) (employing "undue burden" test to evaluate
constitutionality of laws restricting abortion).
162. 316 U.S. at 541 (Douglas, J.); see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Douglas, J)
(explicitly recognizing the "right to privacy"). Justice Douglas stated that "[w]e deal with a
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights - older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions." Id. (Douglas, J.).
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Skinner laid the analytical foundation for all of the cases subse-
quently recognizing unenumerated rights of personal privacy,
including rights to contraception, 163 abortion, 64 marriage, 165 and ho-
mosexuality. 166 Forty-one years later, Justice Anthony Kennedy,
writing for a majority of the Court in Lawrence v. Texas,' 67 explained
the rationale for sheltering "personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and ed-
ucation" 6s behind the mantle of constitutional protection:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under com-
pulsion of the State.
169
Justice Kennedy's description of the fundamental right of pri-
vacy echoes Justice Douglas' opinion in Skinner from sixty-two years
earlier.
B. Freedom of Expression
Prior to 1930, the Supreme Court offered no protection to free-
dom of speech beyond a prohibition on "prior restraints." 70 In several
cases during World War I, the Court affirmed the convictions of anti-
163. See id.; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down law prohibiting
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
164. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down state law prohibiting abortion
except to save the life of the mother on ground that women have a fundamental right to
terminate a pregnancy prior to fetal viability); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (reaffirming Roe).
165. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (Warren, C.J.) (striking down state law
prohibiting interracial marriage, stating that "[tihe freedom to marry has long been
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man'...." (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S.
at 541); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978) (Marshall, J.). Justice Marshall
stated that "[a]lthough Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and
subsequent decisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of fundamental
importance for all individuals." Id. (Marshall, J.).
166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas law that made homosexual
sodomy a crime).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 574 (Kennedy, J.).
169. Id. (Kennedy, J.) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ.)).
170. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (Holmes, J.) (upholding
contempt of court conviction of attorney who had criticized ruling of a court in several
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war protesters under the federal Espionage Act, 171 and over the next
few years the Court affirmed the convictions of communists under
state laws that prohibited "criminal syndicalism" or "criminal anar-
chy."172 Furthermore, at the end of the 19th century the Court had
ruled that American citizens do not have a constitutional right to speak
or protest on public property. 73 In the 1920s, Justices Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Louis Brandeis, who had both initially conformed to the
Court's constricted interpretation of the First Amendment, 174 issued a
series of impassioned dissents defending freedom of speech, 175 but they
were unsuccessful in persuading their fellow justices to accord a
broader scope to freedom of expression.
Between 1930 and 1937 the Supreme Court began to protect
freedom of expression in a number of contexts. In 1931, in Stromberg
v. California,'76 the Court ruled that a statute that prohibited the dis-
play of a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government
was fatally vague, because it failed to exempt from its operation the
use of the flag to peacefully and lawfully bring about a change in gov-
ernment. 77  The Supreme Court also invalidated prior restraints
upon the publication of newspapers. In 1931, in Near v. Minnesota,7 8
the Court struck down a law which allowed the courts to close a defam-
articles and a cartoon, stating that "subsequent punishment" of speech "may extend as well
to the true as to the false.").
171. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding conviction of
defendants under the Espionage Act); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919)
(same); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (same); Abrams, 250 U.S. 616.
172. See Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652 (affirming defendants' convictions for "criminal anarchy");
Whitney, 274 U.S. 357 (affirming defendant's conviction for "criminal syndicalism").
173. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (upholding the conviction of a
person who had delivered a speech on Boston Common in violation of a city ordinance which
made it a crime to deliver a speech on public property without a permit).
174. Justices Holmes and Brandeis joined the opinions of the Court upholding the
Espionage Act convictions in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs (see cases cited supra note 169).
Holmes also authored the opinion of the Court in Patterson (see cases cited supra note 168).
175. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
176. 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (reversing conviction of defendant charged with violating a
state statute that prohibited displaying a red flag as an emblem of opposition to organized
government).
177. See id. at 369 (Hughes, C.J.) ("A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively
construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this
opportunity ['for free political discussion'] is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment.").
178. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (striking down state law which authorized the issuance of an
injunction against the publication of defamatory newspapers).
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atory newspaper, 179 and in 1936, in Grosjean v. American Press Co. ,180
it voided a tax that was imposed upon the gross receipts of newspa-
pers.""1 Finally, in early 1937, before any Roosevelt appointees
ascended to the Court, in De Jonge v. Oregon,18 2 the Court declared
that a person could not be convicted of a crime simply because he had
addressed a meeting of the Communist Party. l8 3
The Roosevelt Court accelerated this trend towards protection
of freedom of expression.184 It first turned its attention to laws that
prohibited people from handing out leaflets on the streets or sidewalks
or from canvassing door-to-door in residential neighborhoods. Today,
we refer to this type of law as a "content neutral" law, because such a
law seeks to restrict or shut off a method of communication without
regard to the ideas that are being expressed.'8 5 The first decision in
this line of cases was in the 1938 case of Lovell v. Griffinl 6 in which
the Court struck down a city ordinance that required people to obtain
the permission of the city manager before handing out leaflets or other
literature. 8 7 Lovell was quickly followed by Schneider v. State,
8 8
which invalidated municipal ordinances that made it a crime to dis-
tribute handbills to pedestrians, passengers, or to place them on
vehicles, 8 9 and Martin v. Struthers,190 which struck down a municipal
ordinance that prohibited people from going door-to-door distributing
literature. 191
179. See id. at 722-23 (Hughes, C.J.) (holding statute unconstitutional under the liberty
of the press guaranteed by the 14th Amendment).
180. 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (striking down state statute imposing a tax on newspapers).
181. Id. at 251 (Sutherland, J.) (striking down tax on ground of liberty of the press
guarantied by the 14th Amendment).
182. 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (reversing defendant's conviction for violation of state law
prohibiting criminal syndicalism).
183. Id. at 365 (Hughes, C.J.) ("[Pleaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be
made a crime.").
184. See WIECEK, supra note 3, at 145-202 (describing freedom of speech decisions of the
Roosevelt Court).
185. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 791, 792 (2nd ed. 1988)
(describing content based laws as those that are "aimed at the communicative impact of an
act" and content neutral laws as those that are "aimed at the noncommunicative impact of
an act.").
186. 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (striking down municipal ordinance requiring permit to
distribute circulars or other literature).
187. Id. at 452 (Hughes, J.) (finding ordinance to be "void on its face.").
188. 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking down municipal ordinances which prohibited the
public distribution of handbills).
189. Id. at 163, 165 (Roberts, J.) (declaring ordinances unconstitutional).
190. 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (striking down municipal ordinance prohibiting persons from
ringing a doorbell or knocking on doors of any residence in order to distribute literature).
191. Id. at 149 (Black, J.) (finding ordinance to be invalid).
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The most significant "content neutral" decision of the Supreme
Court during this era was the 1939 case Hague v. C.LO.,192 which
originated the "public forum doctrine." The case arose because the
public officials of Jersey City had driven labor organizers out of the city
using a variety of tactics, which included prosecuting the organizers for
distributing literature in the public streets. 193 Speaking for the major-
ity of the Court, Justice Roberts stated:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such
use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a
part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens.194
In 1942 in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire'9 the Supreme Court
turned its attention to content based laws. In Chaplinsky the Court
considered the constitutionality of a New Hampshire law that prohib-
ited directing any "offensive, derisive, or annoying word" to another
person as applied to someone who had cursed at a public official while
being arrested. 96 This case is significant because the Court outlined
an analytical framework for assessing the constitutionality of content
based laws, that is, laws that punish speakers for what was said.' 97
The Court explained that certain categories of speech such as "the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words" are entitled to little constitutional protection because they have
little constitutional value.198 Legal scholars continue to debate
whether or not it was wise or appropriate for the Court to distinguish
192. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
193. See id. at 504-506 (Butler, J.) (describing implementation of public officials' policy
to keep labor organizers out of the city).
194. Id. at 515 (Butler, J.).
195. 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (upholding defendant's conviction for violating state law that
prohibited any person from uttering any "offensive, derisive, or annoying word" to another
person in a public place, on the ground that what the defendant said constituted "fighting
words," which are unprotected by the First Amendment).
196. See id. at 570 (Murphy, J.) (stating that Chaplinsky admitted calling the City
Marshall a "damned fascist" and a "damned racketeer").
197. See TRIBE, supra note 185 (describing difference between content based and content
neutral laws).
198. See id. at 572 (Murphy, J.). Justice Murphy stated that "[tihere are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words - those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
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among subject categories of speech, 199 but this "categorical approach"
has remained the dominant method used by the Court to evaluate the
constitutionality of content-based laws,200 and using this approach the
Court has afforded substantial protection to political, religious, scien-
tific, literary, and artistic expression.
20 1
In 1940, in the case of Minersville School District v. Gobitis,202
in an opinion authored by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court up-
held the action of a public school that had expelled two children
because they had refused to salute the American flag and to say the
Pledge of Allegiance. 20 3 Three years later, in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette20 4 in an opinion by Justice Jackson, the
Roosevelt Court overruled Gobitis and held that two schoolchildren
could not be punished for refusing to salute the flag and to say the
Pledge.20 5 Two passages from the opinion of the Court in Barnette are
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Id. (Murphy, J.).
199. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Low Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 547
("Dividing the realm of speech into 'high value,' 'low value,' and 'no value' is quite
problematic."); Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 S.M.U.L. REV. 297,
348 ("[Clategorizing speech on the basis of its supposed value is a dubious practice that
seems to contradict basic First Amendment principles."); R. Scott Shieldes, Suturing
Discourses Within the First Amendment, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1531, 1532-33 (1998) (proposing
"a new dynamic that disposes of the less than useful categorical approach to free speech
doctrine.").
200. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (Scalia, J.) ("[A] limited
categorical approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment
jurisprudence.").
201. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (Blackmun, J.) ("[T]his Court
has recognized that 'the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to
speech uttered during a campaign for political office."') (citation omitted); Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (Scalia, J.) ("[Pirivate religious
speech, far from being a First Amendment orphan, is as fully protected under the Free
Speech Clause as secular private expression."); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S.
234, 247-48 (2002) (Kennedy, J.) (describing the importance of works such as Shakespeare's
Romeo and Juliet and movies such as Traffic and American Beauty); see also Wilson Huhn,
Scienter, Causation, and Harm: The Right-Hand Side of the Constitutional Calculus, 13
WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 125, 129 (2004) ("The value principle is the concept that speech
that serves the search for political, religious, scientific, or artistic truth receives more
protection under the First Amendment than speech that does not.") [hereinafter Scienter,
Causation, and Harm].
202. 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding the expulsion from public school of a 10-year-old
and a 12-year-old for refusing to participate in the flag salute ceremony).
203. See id. at 600 (Frankfurter, J.) (upholding decision of public school expelling
children for refusing to salute and pledge allegiance to the American flag).
204. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down school board regulation requiring all teachers
and students to salute the American flag).
205. See id. at 642 (Jackson, J.). Justice Jackson stated that "[w]e think the action of
the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the
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especially significant. In the first passage, Justice Jackson explained
the purpose of the Bill of Rights:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain sub-
jects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, lib-
erty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship
and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.20 6
In the second famous passage from this opinion, the Court ex-
pressed the essential underlying purpose of the First Amendment:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are
any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now oc-
cur to us.2
0 7
The influence of the Supreme Court's opinion in Barnette has
been profound. The reasoning that the Court articulated establishes
two fundamental doctrines in the law of freedom of expression: the rule
against laws that compel speech 20 and the rule against laws that are
viewpoint-based. 20 9 Furthermore, Justice Jackson's vivid imagery has
captured the imagination of subsequent generations of jurists. The Su-
preme Court has quoted one or both of the forgoing passages from
Justice Jackson's opinion in twenty-six different cases. 210
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control. The
decision of this Court in Minersville School District v. Gobitis and the holdings of those few
per curiam decisions which preceded and foreshadowed it are overruled, and the judgment
enjoining enforcement of the West Virginia Regulation is affirmed." Id. (Jackson, J.).
206. Id. at 638 (Jackson, J.).
207. Id. at 642 (Jackson, J.).
208. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association, 544 U.S. 550, 557 (2004) (Scalia,
J.) ("We first invalidated an outright compulsion of speech in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.").
209. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (Brennan, J.) ("If there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable."); id. at 415 (Brennan, J.). Justice Brennan stated that "[iun holding in
Barnette that the Constitution did not leave this course open to the government, Justice
Jackson described one of our society's defining principles in words deserving of their
frequent repetition: 'If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.'"
Id. (Brennan, J.) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
210. See, e.g., id. at 415.
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In 1949 in Terminiello v. City of Chicago,211 the Supreme Court
added an additional building block to its defense of freedom of expres-
sion: the "overbreadth doctrine."212 Terminiello had been arrested for
disorderly conduct when he refused to stop delivering an incendiary
speech at a rally that had become a riot. 213 Certainly, Terminiello's
conduct at the rally appeared to create a "clear and present danger" of
serious violence; his speech was therefore not protected under the First
Amendment. 214 However, the Court ruled that it was not necessary to
consider whether Terminiello was within his First Amendment rights
in delivering the speech. 215 Instead, the Court ruled that Terminiello
could not be convicted for breach of the peace because even though Ter-
miniello's speech might be unprotected under the First Amendment,
the municipal ordinance under which he was charged was unconstitu-
tional because it had the potential of reaching protected speech. 216 In
this case the Court in effect drew a distinction between First Amend-
ment challenges that attack a law "on its face" and those challenges
that attack a law "as applied" to the particular defendant. Terminiello
mounted a successful facial attack upon the law restricting speech
even though his speech was not protected under the First Amendment,
and even though he might properly have been convicted under a more
narrowly drawn ordinance. The First Amendment "overbreadth doc-
trine" was born.217
211. 337 U.S. 1 (reversing defendant's conviction for breach of the peace on the ground
that the municipal ordinance forbidding was unconstitutional).
212. See Note: The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 845
(1970) ("[T]he Court has been willing to review the breadth of statutory burdens on
expressive activity even in the case of a person whose conduct could constitutionally be
burdened.") (citing Terminiello, 337 U.S. 1; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); and
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)).
213. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 14-22 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (describing Terminiello's
speech and the violent situation in which it was delivered). "[Tihe local court that tried
Terminiello was not indulging in theory. It was dealing with a riot and with a speech that
provoked a hostile mob and incited a friendly one, and threatened violence between the
two." Id. at 14 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("In this case the evidence proves beyond
dispute that danger of rioting and violence in response to the speech was clear, present and
immediate.").
215.. See id. at 3 (Douglas, J.) (referring to the question of whether the defendant's
speech constituted "fighting words," and stating that "[wie do not reach that question, for
there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case.").
216. See id. at 5 (Douglas, J.) ("The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously
invaded... [the First Amendment]. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred
people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction
resting on any of those grounds may not stand.").
217. See supra note 212.
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After Terminiello, at the height of the "second red scare" insti-
gated by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950s, 218 the Roosevelt
Court retreated on First Amendment matters. The Court decisions up-
holding convictions in Feiner v. New York 219 and Dennis v. United
States220 are inconsistent with the principle that persons may not be
punished for expressing unpopular views. 221 But, as noted above, the
Roosevelt Court had already opened the door to greater protection for
freedom of speech and had introduced a number of principles that are
central to modern First Amendment analysis, including the public fo-
rum doctrine, the weighing of expressive value versus expected harm,
the rule against coerced speech, the rule against viewpoint-based laws,
and the overbreadth doctrine. Building on the early legacy of the
Roosevelt Court, the Supreme Court subsequently handed down deci-
sions protecting speech which are more consistent with Barnette and
Terminiello and which implicitly call Feiner and Dennis into
question. 2
22
218. See generally, MARTIN H. REDISH, THE LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION
AND THE MCCARTHY ERA (2005).
219. 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (upholding defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct).
220. 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding defendants' convictions for violation of Smith Act).
221. See Feiner, 340 U.S. at 324-25 (Black, J., dissenting) (setting forth facts of case); id.
at 32 1-22 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The record before us convinces me that petitioner, a young
college student, has been sentenced to the penitentiary for the unpopular views he
expressed on matters of public interest while lawfully making a street-corner speech in'
Syracuse, New York."). See also transcripts of the record in Feiner, available at First
Amendment Online at http://lstam.umn.edu/archive/primary/Feiner.pdf; Dennis, 341 U.S.
at 496 (Vinson, C.J.) (upholding provision of Smith Act which provided, "It shall be unlawful
for any person ... to organize or help to organize any society, group, or assembly of persons
who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of any government in the
United States by force or violence; or to be or become a member of, or affiliate with, any such
society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the purposes thereof.").
222. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363 (1958) (holding that "mere doctrinal
justification" of forcible overthrow is insufficient to justify conviction under the Smith Act);
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (requiring proof of "present advocacy" of violent
acts to justify conviction under the membership clause of the Smith Act); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) ("[W]e are here confronted with a statute which,
by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of
criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action.
Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.");
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (striking down state law prohibiting the desecration of the American
flag); id. at 415 (Brennan, J.) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 ("If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.")).
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C. Freedom of Religion
The principal case decided by the Supreme Court on freedom of
religion before 1937 was Reynolds v. United States,2 23 a polygamy case
that had been decided in 1878. In that case the Court upheld a federal
law against polygamy on the ground that the Constitution protects re-
ligious beliefs but not religiously motivated conduct.224
The opinion of the Court in Reynolds is inconsistent with the
text of the First Amendment, which protects the "free exercise" of relig-
ion.225 This language plainly means that the Constitution does not
simply protect what we think, but also what we do in the service of our
religion. In 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecticut226 the Supreme Court
gave effect to the plain language of the First Amendment, ruling that
"the Amendment embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and free-
dom to act. ' 227 The Court concluded that although the freedom to act
is not absolute, Jesse Cantwell did have the right to express his relig-
ious views on a public street without first obtaining a license, 228 and
his conduct did not constitute a breach of the peace. 229 The Court also
ruled that the religion clauses of the First Amendment are applicable
against the States. 23
0
The most significant judicial decision on the Establishment
Clause - a decision that Justice Scalia has referred to as "the fountain-
223. 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding federal law prohibiting polygamy).
224. See id. at 166 (Waite, C.J.) ("Laws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices.").
225. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, which provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ").
226. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (reversing defendants' convictions for soliciting funds for a
religious purpose without a license, and defendant Jesse Cantwell's conviction for breach of
the peace).
227. Id. at 303 (Roberts, J.).
228. See id. (Roberts, J.) ("We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the
appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
229. See id. at 310 (Roberts, J.) ("We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of
bodily harm, no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse. On the
contrary, we find only an effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute
money in the interest of what Cantwell, however misguided others may think him,
conceived to be true religion.").
230. See id. at 303 (Roberts, J.) ("The First Amendment declares that Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws.").
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head" of modern First Amendment analysis in this field 231 - was also
issued by the Roosevelt Court. In 1947, in Everson v. Connecticut,232
all nine justices of the Supreme Court agreed that the purpose of the
Establishment Clause was to create "a wall of separation" between
church and state. 233 Although a divided Court voted to uphold public
financing of bus transportation of children to parochial schools,234 the
justices were unanimous in their opinion that the Constitution de-
mands that the government remain "neutral" towards religion. 235
The neutrality principle has remained the cornerstone of the
principle of freedom of religion ever since, and the Court has invoked
231. See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 890 n.2 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) as "the
fountainhead of this jurisprudence . . . ," interpreting the Establishment Clause as
prohibiting "governmental affirmation of society's belief in God.").
232. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding state law authorizing local boards of education
resolution to reimburse parents for the costs of sending their children to parochial schools).
233. See id. at 15-16 (Black, J.). Justice Black stated that "[t]he 'establishment of
religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church
and State.'" Id. (Black, J.). See also id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (stating that the
purpose of the Establishment Clause was "to create a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every
form of public aid or support for religion."); id. at 26 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("There is no
answer to the proposition more fully expounded by Mr. Justice Rutledge that the effect of
the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to take every form of propagation
of religion out of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly be made public
business and thereby be supported in whole or in part at taxpayers' expense.").
234. See id. at 17 (Black, J.) (upholding law permitting school districts to reimburse
parents for costs of transporting children to private schools, including religious schools).
235. See id. at 18 (Black, J.) ("That Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions, than it is
to favor them."); id. at 23-24 (Jackson, J.) (describing the public schools as having been
"organized on the premise that secular education can be isolated from all religious teaching
so that the school can inculcate all needed temporal knowledge and also maintain a strict
and lofty neutrality as to religion."); id. at 59 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("[l]t is only by
observing the prohibition rigidly that the state can maintain its neutrality and avoid
partisanship in the dissensions inevitable when sect opposes sect over demands for public
moneys to further religious education, teaching or training in any form or degree, directly or
indirectly.").
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the concept in many of its decisions. 236 But with the retirement of Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor, who developed the principle that the
government is prohibited from "endorsing" religion, 237 it is unclear
whether the Court will retain the neutrality principle. The modern
criticism of the neutrality principle is reviewed in Part III below. 238
D. Commerce Clause
The interpretation of the Commerce Clause is a "human rights"
issue for one simple reason. Many of the most significant federal civil
rights laws have been enacted pursuant to Congress' power to regulate
commerce. 239 If the Supreme Court had continued to adhere to the
narrow, pre-1937 reading of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause, it would have made it difficult or impossible for Congress to
have adopted this legislation.240
Even considered solely from an economic perspective, there is
no doubt that President Roosevelt considered the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause to be central to the struggle for human rights, for
236. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Clark, J.).
Justice Clark stated that "[t]he wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak
thus stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or groups might
bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions or a concert or dependency of
one upon the other to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government
would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies." Id. (Clark, J.). See also
McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 860 (Souter, J.) ("The touchstone for our analysis is the
principle that the 'First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion
and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."') (citations omitted).
237. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(proposing the "no endorsement" test). Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he purpose prong of
the Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the
practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An
affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged practice invalid." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
238. See infra text accompanying notes 394-409.
239. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Title II of
Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause).
240. See, e.g., Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Congress had
authority under Commerce Clause, but not under § 5 of the 14th Amendment, to adopt Age
Discrimination in Employment Act); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001) (Congress had authority under Commerce Clause, but not under § 5 of the 14th
Amendment, to adopt Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (ruling that Congress lacked
authority under either Commerce Clause or § 5 of the 14th Amendment to enact the federal
Violence Against Women Act).
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Roosevelt believed it was the obligation of the government to protect
the average person from economic exploitation.
241
During President Roosevelt's first term, 1932-1936, the Su-
preme Court aggressively struck down vital New Deal legislation
protecting workers and regulating industry on the ground that Con-
gress lacked authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate "local"
means of production such as factories, mines, and farms.242 The rul-
ings of the Supreme Court became an issue in the 1936 Presidential
election, primarily because Alf Landon and his supporters predicted
(quite accurately, as it turned out) that Roosevelt would change the
direction of the Court if he were given the opportunity to appoint jus-
tices during a second term.
243
Landon actually understated Roosevelt's determination to
change the make-up of the Court. On February 5, 1937, one month
into his second term, Roosevelt unveiled his "court-packing plan."
244
Roosevelt proposed to appoint one new justice for every justice over the
age of 70 who did not retire, which would have given him six additional
appointments, more than enough to secure a majority that would up-
hold his New Deal legislation.
245
241. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
242. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)
(invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act partly on the ground that the enactment
of the law was beyond Congress' power under the Commerce Clause). See also NEW DEAL,
supra note 17, at 145 (1963) (quoting a newspaper headline stating "America Stunned:
Roosevelt's Two Years' Work Killed in Twenty Minutes," and stating that Roosevelt was
"dumbfounded" by the Court's decision in Schechter and that in speaking to reporters
Roosevelt compared the Schechter decision to Dred Scott).
243. See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 40 (quoting Roosevelt as stating in June of 1936
"that he believed the Constitution had not been meant to be a dead hand 'blocking
humanity's progress' but rather 'a living force for the expression of the national will with
respect to national needs.'"); ACKERMAN, supra note 25, at 313 ("Landon and his partisans
emphasized the danger of court-packing in their last-ditch efforts to mobilize the American
people."); id. (quoting columnist H.L. Mencken, an opponent of Roosevelt, who on August 17,
1936 wrote, "During his second term, if he has one, [Roosevelt] will have the choosing of at
least three judges, and perhaps of all nine .... Thus his reelection will set off the most
violent attack upon the Constitution ever made ....").
244. See NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 232 (describing court-packing plan); SUPREME
COURT REBORN, supra note 24, at 169 (same); see also PARKER, supra note 10, at 114-15,
Fireside Chat of March 9, 1937 (in which Roosevelt explained the purpose of his proposal to
add justices to the Supreme Court, stating that "[d] uring the past half century the balance
of power between the three great branches of the federal government has been tipped out of
balance by the courts in direct contradiction of the high purposes of the framers of the
Constitution. It is my purpose to restore that balance.").
245. See NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 232-33; SUPREME COURT REBORN, supra note 24,
at 169.
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Congress and the public rejected Roosevelt's plan,246 but he ul-
timately achieved a constitutional victory anyway before he had
appointed a single justice.247 In April of 1937 the Supreme Court de-
cided Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B. ,248 in which the Court
ruled that Congress did have authority to adopt a law requiring em-
ployers to recognize unions and to bargain collectively. 249 The
following month, Justice Van Devanter announced his retirement from
the bench, thus ensuring that the Supreme Court would no longer
stand in the way of Roosevelt's policies.
250
In its ruling in Jones & Laughlin Steel, however, the Supreme
Court emphasized the enormous size of the company's operations and
the interstate character of its transactions. After a lengthy description
of the company's many plants and holdings, the Court adopted this
finding:
Summarizing these operations, the Labor Board concluded that the
works in Pittsburgh and Aliquippa "might be likened to the heart of
a self-contained, highly integrated body. They draw in the raw
materials from Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania
in part through arteries and by means controlled by the respondent;
they transform the materials and then pump them out to all parts
of the nation through the vast mechanism which the respondent
has elaborated."
To carry on the activities of the entire steel industry, 33,000 men
mine ore, 44,000 men mine coal, 4,000 men quarry limestone,
16,000 men manufacture coke, 343,000 men manufacture steel, and
83,000 men transport its product. Respondent has about 10,000 eln-
ployees in its Aliquippa plant, which is located in a community of
about 30,000 persons. 25
1
246. NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 233-37 (describing reaction to the Roosevelt's court-
packing plan).
247. See UROFSKY, supra note 48, at 43 ("Roosevelt... lost the battle but won the war.");
NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 237 (quoting Senator Byrnes, a supporter of the court-packing
plan, as saying, "Why run for a train after you've caught it?").
248. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act against a
constitutional challenge).
249. See id. at 43 (Hughes, C.J.) ("[W]e have no doubt that Congress had constitutional
authority to safeguard the right of respondent's employees to self-organization and freedom
in the choice of representatives for collective bargaining.").
250. See NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 237; SUPREME COURT REBORN, supra note 24, at
211 (quoting Charlotte Williams, a biographer of Black, stating that Black's appointment
"made it plain beyond all doubt that the Court was about to be reconstituted in the image of
the New Deal."). See also id. at 180 (speculating that Justice Van Devanter may have
retired in May of 1937 in order to derail the court-packing plan, or possibly in response to
"more favorable retirement legislation.").
251. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 27 (Hughes, C.J.).
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The Court ruled that Congress had the power to require Jones
& Laughlin Steel to bargain collectively with its employees, 252 but the
decision implicitly left open the question of whether federal law could
constitutionally be made applicable to businesses that were not, in and
of themselves, interstate in scope. The Roosevelt Court conclusively
settled that question in United States v. Darby253 and Wickard v.
Filburn.254
In Darby the Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act, which set minimum wages and maximum
hours for workers, as applied to a Georgia lumber mill. 255 The Court
stated that intrastate commercial activities of a business might be reg-
ulated if they "affect" interstate commerce, 256 and held that the law
could be applied to small businesses because "the total effect of the
competition of many small producers may be great."257 The Court reaf-
firmed this principle in Wickard in ruling that the federal Agricultural
Adjustment Act, which limited the production of wheat, could be con-
stitutionally applied to a small farm.258 Justice Jackson, writing for a
unanimous Court, stated:
That appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of fed-
eral regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together
with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. 259
These cases establish Congress' power to regulate virtually
every aspect of the national economy, including small commercial en-
252. See id. at 43 (Hughes, J.) ("[W]e have no doubt that Congress had constitutional
authority to safeguard the right of respondent's employees to self-organization and freedom
in the choice of representatives for collective bargaining.").
253. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
254. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
255. Darby, 312 U.S. at 111 (Stone, J.).
256. 312 U.S. at 118 (Stone, J.) ("The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not
confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities
intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over
it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end,
the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.").
257. Id. at 123 (Stone, J.) ("Congress, to attain its objective in the suppression of
nationwide competition in interstate commerce by goods produced under substandard labor
conditions, has made no distinction as to the volume or amount of shipments in the
commerce or of production for commerce by any particular shipper or producer. It
recognized that in present day industry, competition by a small part may affect the whole
and that the total effect of the competition of many small producers may be great.").
258. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114 (Jackson, J.) (describing Filburn's operation as a "small
farm").
259. Id. at 127-28 (Jackson, J.).
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terprises. 260 In later decades, when Congress enacted civil rights
legislation such as the Public Accommodations Act, 261 the Age Discrim-
ination in Employment Act, 262 the Family Medical Leave Act, 263 and
the Americans With Disabilities Act,264 the Supreme Court upheld
these laws as valid exercises of Congress' power under the Commerce
Clause.265
E. State Action
The State Action Doctrine is not simply a technicality. Instead
it is a principle of civil rights that lies at the heart of Constitutional
Law.
2 6 6
The Constitution is the law that governs the government
267 - it
260. See id. at 125 (Jackson, J.) ("[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it may
not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce .
261. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et. seq.
262. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq.
263. 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et. seq.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.
265. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241 (Title Il of Civil Rights Act of 1964 validly
enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause); Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (Americans with Disabilities
Act enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause); Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (Family Medical Leave Act enacted pursuant to Commerce
Clause).
266. See generally Wilson Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of
Democratic Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379 (2006) (characterizing the central purpose of
the state action doctrine as the promotion of "democratic choice").
267. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.). Chief Justice Marshall stated
that "the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such
principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on
which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a
very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles,
therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority, from which they
proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. This original
and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns, to different departments, their
respective powers. It may either stop here; or establish certain limits not to be transcended
by those departments." Id. (Marshall, C.J.). See also James Madison, The Federalist
Papers: No. 51, The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and
Balances Between the Different Departments, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/
avalon/federal/fed5l.htm. Madison wrote: "But what is government itself, but the greatest
of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself." Id.
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does not apply to private parties. 268 This conclusion is apparent from
the text of the Constitution. The First Amendment commences with
the words "Congress shall make no law ... *"269 and the Fourteenth
Amendment provides "No state shall... "270 The Constitution prohib-
its both the federal and the state governments from violating our
fundamental rights, but the actions of individuals and private corpora-
tions are not governed by the Constitution.2 7 1  This rule of
constitutional law is called the "state action doctrine."
The Supreme Court first articulated the state action doctrine in
1875272 and formally adopted it in 1883.273 Before 1937 the state ac-
tion doctrine was applied in a number of cases to strike down federal
laws protecting blacks. The Court ruled, over and over, in cases where
blacks had been lynched, murdered, beaten, prevented from voting,
and otherwise discriminated against, that Congress lacked the author-
ity under the Constitution to punish this conduct. Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment confers power upon the Congress only to "en-
force the provisions of this Article,"274 meaning that Congress only has
268. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (Bradley, J.) (describing Section 1
of the 14th Amendment, and stating that "[i] t is state action of a particular character that is
prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the
amendment."); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (Vinson, C.J.) ("Since the decision
of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, the principle has become firmly embedded in our
constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful."). Cf The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20 (Bradley, J.) (noting that the 13th
Amendment is "direct and primary" in its character, in that it abolishes slavery, and
authorizes Congress to adopt legislation to abolish all of the "badges and incidents of slavery
in the United States" whether the result of state action or private action).
269. U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added).
270. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, sec. 1 (emphasis added).
271. See supra note 268.
272. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (Waite, C.J.) ("The
fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as
against another."); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629, 638 (1883) (Woods, J.). Justice Woods stated that the 14th Amendment "[i]s a
guaranty against the exertion of arbitrary and tyrannical power on the part of the
government and legislature of the state, not a guaranty against the commission of
individual offenses; and the power of congress, whether express or implied, to legislate for
the enforcement of such a guaranty, does not extend to the passage of laws for the
suppression of ordinary crime within the states." Id. (Woods, J.) (quoting United States v.
Cruikshank, 25 Fed. Cas. 707, 710 (C.C. La. 1874) (Bradley, J.)).
273. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
274. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
against "state action," not against private action. 275
What changed after 1937 was that the Supreme Court began to
rule that private parties are subject to the dictates of the Constitution
in certain situations. The Roosevelt Court found that there was "state
action" even in cases where private parties had violated other people's
fundamental rights. The decision of the Supreme Court in Smith v.
Allwright276 demonstrated in dramatic fashion the sea change that oc-
curred in the Roosevelt Court's understanding of the "state action"
doctrine.
In Smith, decided in 1944, the Supreme Court determined that
the policy of the Democratic Party of the State of Texas to prohibit
blacks from becoming members of the party and from voting in pri-
mary elections constituted "state action," and therefore was a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 277 In
Smith the Court overruled Grovey v. Townsend,278 a 1936 case in
which the Court had unanimously upheld the "white primary" rules of
the Texas Democratic Party.279 In overruling Grovey the Smith Court
stated, "when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt con-
strained to follow precedent."280
Two years later in Marsh v. Alabama28 1 the Roosevelt Court
ruled that the actions of the Gulf Shipbuilding Company in preventing
a Jehovah's Witness from distributing literature in the company-
275. See Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1871) (perpetrators of racial murders
could not be tried in federal court pursuant to federal removal statute); Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (holding that perpetrators of the notorious Colfax Massacre could not be charged under
federal law); Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (ruling that the members of a lynch mob could not be
punished under federal law); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (invalidating Civil Rights
Act of 1875 on the ground that Congress lacked authority under 14th Amendment to
prohibit private acts of discrimination).
276. 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down the rule of the State Democratic Party
excluding blacks from membership, and therefore excluding them from voting in primary
elections).
277. See id. at 664-65 (Reed, J.) ("The privilege of membership in a party may be, as this
Court said in Grovey v. Townsend, no concern of a state. But when, as here, that privilege is
also the essential qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for a general
election, the state makes the action of the party the action of the state.").
278. 295 U.S. 45 (1936) (upholding rule of State Democratic Party excluding blacks from
membership).
279. See id. at 55 (Roberts, J.) (stating that "the privilege of membership in a party" is of
"no concern" to the State).
280. Smith, 321 U.S. at 665 (Reed, J.).
281. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding the presence of "state action" and reversing
defendant's conviction for trespass on First Amendment grounds).
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owned town of Chickasaw, Alabama, violated the First Amendment.
2 2
Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated:
We do not agree that the corporation's property interests settle the
question. The State urges in effect that the corporation's right to
control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the right
of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his guests. We can not
accept that contention. Ownership does not always mean absolute
dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his prop-
erty for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it. Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries,
turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer
does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily
to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public
function, it is subject to state regulation. 28
3
Like Smith, Marsh stands for the proposition that the action of
a private organization may constitute "state action," and therefore the
action of the organization must conform to the principles of fairness
and tolerance that are set forth in the Constitution. The Court justi-
fied its ruling in Marsh by observing that it was necessary to prevent
the Gulf Shipbuilding Company from censoring the information that is
disseminated to its employees. 28 4 The First Amendment rights of the
residents of the company town outweighed the property rights of the
employer. 28
5
A third significant state action case decided by the Roosevelt
Court is Shelley v. Kraemer,28 6 which was handed down in 1948. In
282. See id. at 509 (Black, J.) ("In our view the circumstance that the property rights to
the premises where the deprivation of liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others
than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a
community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of
such restraint by the application of a State statute. Insofar as the State has attempted to
impose criminal punishment on appellant for undertaking to distribute religious literature
in a company town, its action cannot stand.").
283. Id. at 506 (Black, J.).
284. See id. at 508-509 (Black, J.). Justice Black stated that "[miany people in the
United States live in company-owned towns. These people, just as residents of
municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens they
must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good
citizens they must be informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their
information must be uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the
liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing
these freedoms with respect to any other citizen." Id. (Black, J.).
285. See id. at 509 (Black, J.) ("When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of
property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here,
we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.").
286.. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (reversing the decision of a state court enforcing a racially
restrictive covenant).
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that case a private homeowner brought a lawsuit against a neighbor in
an effort to enforce a racial covenant, entered into by prior owners of
the homes, which prohibited blacks from occupying homes in the
neighborhood. 2 7 The Supreme Court ruled that although the action of
the homeowners entering into the restrictive covenant was private ac-
tion,288 the judicial enforcement of the covenant constituted state
action, and thus was prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. 28 9
These three cases were only the first of many, decided down to
the present day, in which the Court has found "state action" in the
conduct of private parties. 290 The essential concept is that when the
state has "significantly involved itself" with private parties sufficiently
imbued with governmental power, their conduct will be considered to
be "state action."291 There are at least five recognized categories of sit-
uations where the Court will find "state action." Smith and Marsh
represent cases where a private party is exercising a "public func-
tion."292 Shelley leads the "judicial enforcement" category. 293 In recent
decades the Court has recognized at least three other categories of pri-
vate conduct that constitute "state action": occasions when the
government has "influenced, encouraged, or coerced" a private party
into committing a violation of the Constitution;294 projects where the
287. See id. at 4-7 (Vinson, C.J.) (describing facts of cases before the Court).
288. See id. at 13 (Vinson, C.J.) ("[Tihe restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be
regarded as a violation of any rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth
Amendment. So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary
adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State
and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated.").
289. See id. at 20 (Vinson, C.J.) ("We hold that in granting judicial enforcement of the
restrictive agreements in these cases, the States have denied petitioners the equal
protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand.").
290. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (finding that
the action of a privately-owned restaurant to discriminate on the basis of race constituted
"state action" where the restaurant was located in and leased space from a publicly
operated, publicly funded parking deck).
291. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967) (White, J.) (noting "the
necessity for a court to assess the potential impact of official action in determining whether
the State has significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations.").
292. See supra text accompanying notes 276, 281.
293. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20 (Vinson, C.J.) (finding "judicial enforcement" of
restrictive covenants to be state action); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)
(finding attachment procedure to constitute state action).
294. See, e.g., Reitman, 387 U.S. at 381 (White, J.) ("The California Supreme Court
believes that the section will significantly encourage and involve the State in private
discriminations. We have been presented with no persuasive considerations indicating that
these judgments should be overturned.").
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government and the private party are "joint participants";295 and situ-
ations where the government is "pervasively entwined" with private
parties in the governance of an organization.
296
While the justices of the Supreme Court still disagree about the
nature and extent of governmental involvement that must be present
before the actions of a private party will be construed as "state action,"
the legal foundation for finding "state action" in the acts of private par-
ties was established by the Roosevelt Court in Smith, Marsh and
Shelley.
F. Separation of Powers
In the 220 years that the Constitution has guided our society
and determined our forms of government, the leading decision of the
Supreme Court in the field of Separation of Powers is Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,297 and it is a product of the Roosevelt
Court. The Court's opinion in Youngstown is a bulwark against dicta-
torship written by men who had grappled with its horrors. The
Youngstown case stands for the proposition that even in wartime the
President must obey and uphold the law.
298
The leading opinions in that case, which were authored by
Roosevelt appointees Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert Jack-
son, are described above.299 The legal principles that were articulated
by those three justices in Youngstown have been applied by the Su-
preme Court whenever the President has overstepped his
constitutional powers. In United States v. Nixon,300 the Court invoked
the Youngstown decision in ordering President Richard Nixon to turn
over evidence of his own wrongdoing to a grand jury.30 1 In Hamdi v.
295. See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. at 725 (Clark, J.) ("The State has so far insinuated itself
into a position of interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have
been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
296. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S.
288, 291 (2001) (Souter, J.) ("'WVe hold that the association's regulatory activity may and
should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials
in the structure of the association . . ").
297. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down Presidential order seizing steel industry to
prevent work stoppage during Korean War).
298. See supra text accompanying notes 113-31.
299. See id.
300. 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (ordering President to comply with subpoena requiring
disclosure of confidential communications with advisors).
301. See id. at 703 (Burger, C.J.) ("No holding of the Court has defined the scope of
judicial power specifically relating to the enforcement of a subpoena for confidential
Presidential communications for use in a criminal prosecution, but other exercises of power
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Rumsfeld,30 2 where the Court ruled that the President may not indefi-
nitely detain suspected terrorists as part of the War on Terror,30 3 the
Court cited Youngstown for the proposition that "a state of war is not a
black check for the President."30 4 The significance of Youngstown was
reiterated in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,305 decided in 2006, where the Su-
preme Court stated:
Whether or not the President has independent power, absent con-
gressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may
not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of
its own war powers, placed on his powers. The Government does
not argue otherwise. 3
0 6
In the near future the Supreme Court may be called upon to
determine whether or not President George W. Bush had the inherent
authority under the Constitution to order the National Security Ad-
ministration to eavesdrop on the international communications of
American citizens without a warrant in direct violation of federal stat-
by the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch have been found invalid as in conflict
with the Constitution.") (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Youngstown, 343
U.S. 579); id. at 707 (Burger, C.J.). Justice Burger stated: "In designing the structure of our
Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal
branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but
the separate powers were not intended to operate with absolute independence. 'While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.' To read the Art. II
powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential
to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public
interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the
constitutional balance of 'a workable government' and gravely impair the role of the courts
under Art. III." Id. (citations omitted).
302. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (ruling that President may not indefinitely detain "enemy
combatants," and that prisoners who are being held at Guantanamo Bay are entitled to a
fair hearing to determine whether they are "enemy combatants.").
303. Id. at 521 (O'Connor, J.) ("Certainly, we agree that indefinite detention for the
purpose of interrogation is not authorized. Further, we understand Congress' grant of
authority for the use of 'necessary and appropriate force' to include the authority to detain
for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on longstanding
law-of-war principles.").
304. Id. at 536 (O'Connor, J.) ("We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a
blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.") (citing
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587)).
305. 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) (ruling that military commissions established by the
President to try prisoners for various terrorism-related offenses failed to comply with
requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
306. Id. at 2774 n.23 (Stevens, J.) (citation omitted).
2007 IN DEFENSE OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT 51
utes,30 7 and, if he ordered the Central Intelligence Agency and Military
Intelligence to torture suspected terrorists in direct violation of federal
and international law, whether he had the inherent authority to do
so. 308 If these issues should come before the Supreme Court of the
United States, the cases will be governed by the principles articulated
in the Youngstown decision.
G. Equal Protection
Prior to 1937, the Equal Protection Clause in general "had
fallen into disuse and contempt,"30 9 to the point that in 1927 the Court,
in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, referred to a legal
claim arising under Equal Protection as "the usual last resort of consti-
tutional arguments. 3 10 Furthermore, just as it had condoned and
protected slavery before the Civil War,311 the Supreme Court condoned
and protected racial segregation up until 1937.312 It was the Roosevelt
307. See ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 734 (2006) (ruling that President lacked authority
under the Constitution to order the Agency's warrantless eavesdropping program in
violation of federal statutes).
308. See, e.g., Padilla's Papers Detail Charges of Mistreatment, N.Y. Times, November 2,
2006, at A19 (Jose Padilla, an American citizen, asserts that for nearly four years, while he
was held in the United States in military custody, military interrogators "threatened him
with 'imminent execution' or with painful cuts; that he was forced to wear a hood and stand
in 'stress positions' for long periods; that noxious fumes were sometimes introduced into his
cell that he was forced to endure extreme heat and cold, bright lights or total darkness,
denied opportunities to shower for weeks and deprived of sleep; and that he was not
provided with a copy of the Koran."); Bill Dedman, Can the "20th Hijacker" Ever Stand
Trial: Abusive Interrogation at Guantanamo May Prevent His Prosecution, MSNBC, October
26, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.comfid/15361462/ (describing the treatment
accorded a prisoner by military interrogators at Guantanamo Bay, "Mohammed al-Qahtani,
detainee No. 063, was forced to wear a bra. He had a thong placed on his head. He was
massaged by a female interrogator who straddled him like a lap dancer. He was told that
his mother and sisters were whores. He was told that other detainees knew he was gay. He
was forced to dance with a male interrogator. He was strip-searched in front of women. He
was led on a leash and forced to perform dog tricks. He was doused with water. He was
prevented from praying. He was forced to watch as an interrogator squatted over his
Koran.").
309. DoMNARSKI, supra note 1, at 137.
310. Buck, 274 U.S. at 208 (Holmes, J.).
311. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842) (striking down a Pennsylvania
law that prohibited any person from forcibly removing persons from the State for the
purpose of enslaving them); Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393 (declaring the Missouri Compromise
unconstitutional, and ruling that Congress lacks the authority to prohibit slavery from the
territories of the United States); Abelman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858) (upholding the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 "in all of its provisions").
312. See, e.g., Blyew, 80 U.S. 581 (reversing the murder conviction of two whites who
had killed members of a black family on the ground-that removal of this case to federal court
was improper because, the Court reasoned, the rights of the victim and the witness were not
FLORIDA A & M UNIV. LAW REVIEW Vol. 2:1:1
Court that initiated the process of removing this moral cancer from our
fundamental law, and it was Roosevelt appointees who provided the
majority of the votes to overrule the pernicious doctrine of "separate
but equal."3
13
After 1937, the Roosevelt Court made two momentous contribu-
tions to the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. First, in a
concurring opinion Justice Robert Jackson articulated the core mean-
ing of Equal Protection, a standard for measuring whether or not the
government is observing the principle of equality under the law.314
Second, the Court as a whole decided that racial classifications in the
law must be strictly scrutinized.3 1 5
Railway Express Agency v. New York 316 was a simple case, but
in the course of his separate concurring opinion Justice Jackson ex-
pressed a fundamental truth about the Equal Protection Clause. The
issue was the constitutionality of a New York City ordinance that out-
lawed the practice of putting motor vehicles on the streets for the sole
purpose of displaying advertising.31 7 The businesses that challenged
the law claimed that the law violated the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause other businesses could advertise, for example, on their delivery
trucks or on the sides of buses.318 Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court
upheld the law,319 but Justice Jackson's statement of the relevant
"affected" by the fact that blacks were not allowed to testify in State courts); United States
v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (striking down civil rights law protecting blacks right to vote);
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (reversing the convictions of the perpetrators of the Colfax
Massacre, on the ground that the indictment had simply stated that the victims were black,
instead of stating that the murders were committed because the victims were black); The
Civil Rights Cases, 106 U.S. 3 (striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a law prohibiting
segregation in certain places of public accommodation); Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583
(1883) (upholding Alabama statute forbidding blacks and whites from marrying or from
having sex with each other); Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (declaring a civil rights law, the
Enforcement Act of 1871, to be unconstitutional, thus reversing the convictions of a lynch
mob); Plessy v. Ferguson, 63 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana law requiring segregated
passenger cars on trains); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding
Mississippi election laws designed to disenfranchise blacks); Cumming v. Richmond Bd. of
Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (refusing to intervene when the City of Richmond closed the high
school for blacks but kept the school for whites open); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927)
(upholding racial segregation in the public schools).
313. See infra text accompanying notes 326-36.
314. See infra text accompanying notes 316-25.
315. See infra text accompanying notes 346-48.
316. 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (upholding municipal regulation prohibiting the operation of
vehicles on the public streets for the sole purpose of advertising).
317. See id. at 107 (Douglas, J.) (setting forth the ordinance in question).
318. See id. at 109-10 (Douglas, J.) (discussing due process and equal protection claims).
319. See id. at 111 (Douglas, J.) (affirming the decision of the lower courts upholding the
ordinance).
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standard has become a common understanding of the purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause. First, Justice Jackson expressed the practi-
cal meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. He said:
I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal
Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate
between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentia-
tion fairly related to the object of regulation. This equality is not
merely abstract justice. The framers of the Constitution knew, and
we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical
guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon
a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited
upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no bet-
ter measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that
laws be equal in operation.
320
Justice Jackson then articulated what he considered to be the
relevant constitutional standard. He concluded that the ordinance was
constitutional
because there is a real difference between doing in self-interest and
doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate action from those
who act on their own and it is another thing to permit the same
action to be promoted for a price. 321
The principle that Justice Jackson articulated in this otherwise
unnoteworthy case holds the potential to remake American society. It
is the idea that people may not be treated differently unless there are
real differences between them and others. This interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause is of fundamental importance because it com-
pletes the task that the Framers failed to accomplish. The founders of
our Nation declared that "all men are created equal"322 but they ne-
glected to enshrine the concept of "equality" in the original
Constitution. The reason for this failure is easily understood. The
Constitution was a bargain between the North and the South, and it
included a "dirty compromise" that protected the institution of slav-
ery. 3 23 While the Preamble of the Constitution hypocritically states
320. Id. at 112-13 (Jackson, J., concurring).
321. Id. at 116 (Jackson, J., concurring).
322. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
323. See Paul Finkelman, Garrison's Constitution: The Covenant with Death and How It
Was Made, 32 National Archives Prologue Magazine No. 4, available at http://www.
archives.gov/publications/prologue/2000/winter/garrisons-constitution-2.html (describing
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that it is intended to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and
our posterity,"324 there was not even a pretense in the original Consti-
tution that it was intended to protect equality.
325
It was the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment who intro-
duced the concept of equality into our fundamental law, and it was the
justices of the Roosevelt Court who embarked upon the unfinished
work of breathing life into that principle by attacking and dismantling
the system of state-sponsored racial apartheid that so many genera-
tions of Americans had suffered under.
326
In 1938, shortly after Roosevelt appointees commenced their
work, the Court ruled in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada327 that the
State of Missouri had violated its duty under the Equal Protection
Clause to provide equal educational opportunities to its black citizens
when it refused to enroll black students at the State's only public law
school. 328 The State of Missouri offered to pay the student's tuition at
an out-of-state institution, but the Court ruled that this was not suffi-
cient to satisfy the obligation of the State under the Equal Protection
Clause.329 In 1950, the Supreme Court followed with Sweatt v.
Painter,330 where the Court found that black students were denied
equal opportunity by the State of Texas when it created a small, un-
known law school for blacks, 331 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
the "dirty compromise" between the northern and southern delegates to the Constitutional
Convention which protected the slave trade).
324. U.S. CONST., pmbl.
325. See U.S. CONST., art. I, sec. 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths clause, counting slaves as 3/5 of a
person for purposes of taxation and representation); U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 9, cl. 1
(protecting slave trade for a period of 20 years); U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 3 (fugitive
slave clause, requiring states to deliver up escaped slaves); U.S. CONST. art V (prohibiting
any constitutional amendment abolishing the slave trade for 20 years).
326. See generally C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (1966)
(describing racial discrimination and segregation in America from the Civil War to the
1960s).
327. 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (ruling that the State of Missouri violated the equal protection
clause when it refused admission of a black student to the state-supported law school).
328. See id. at 343 (Hughes, C.J.) (stating that the student "was refused admission upon
the ground that it was 'contrary to the constitution, laws and public policy of the State to
admit a negro as a student in the University of Missouri."').
329. See id. at 349 (Hughes, C.J.) ("The basic consideration is not as to what sort of
opportunities, other States provide, or whether they are as good as those in Missouri, but as
to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes to white students and denies to negroes
solely upon the ground of color.").
330. 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding that the educational opportunities offered to white and
black students at state-supported law schools were not substantially equal, and that the
State was therefore in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
331. See id. at 633-34 (Vinson, C.J.). Chief Justice Vinson stated that "[iun terms of
number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for specialization, size of the
Vol. 2: 1:1
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Regents for Higher Education,332 where the Court ruled that the State
of Oklahoma had violated equal protection when it required a graduate
student in education to attend class, study, and eat in segregation from
his white classmates.
333
Gaines, Sweatt, and McLaurin paved the way for Brown v.
Board of Education.334 These three pre-Brown cases established that
equality is to be measured not simply on the basis of physical factors,
but also on the basis of the message that the government is communi-
cating when it establishes separate facilities for blacks. The Roosevelt
Court had begun to analyze why the government was separating the
races, and what inferences a reasonable person would draw from the
government's actions. In Brown the Supreme Court, speaking unani-
mously through Chief Justice Earl Warren, drew these conclusions
regarding the message that is communicated by official acts of racial
segregation:
In Sweatt v. Painter, in finding that a segregated law school for Ne-
groes could not provide them equal educational opportunities, this
Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school." In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, the Court, in re-
quiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated
like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations:
"... his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange
views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession."
Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and
high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and quali-
fications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
student body, scope of the library, availability of law review and similar activities, the
University of Texas Law School is superior. What is more important, the University of
Texas Law School possesses to a far greater degree those qualities which are incapable of
objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to
name but a few, include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position
and influence of the alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige." Id.
(Vinson, C.J.).
332. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (ruling that the black student was entitled to be treated the
same as white students at the University of Oklahoma).
333. See id. at 640 (Vinson, C.J.) ("[Hie was required to sit apart at a designated desk in
an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of
the library, but not to use the desks in the regular reading room; and to sit at a designated
table and to eat at a different time from the other students in the school cafeteria."); id. at
641 (Vinson, C.J.) (.Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his
profession."); id. at 642 (Vinson, C.J.) ("[Tihe conditions under which this appellant is
required to receive his education deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal
protection of the laws.").
334. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (declaring state-sponsored racial segregation of the public
schools to be unconstitutional).
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inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
33 5
The true evil of segregation is that it instills notions of racial
superiority in whites336 and notions of inferiority in blacks. In Brown
v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court of the United States, includ-
ing five justices appointed by Franklin Roosevelt, unanimously ruled
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the government from en-
dorsing this message.
The greatest failure in the modern era in the field of Equal Pro-
tection was also, sadly, the work of the Roosevelt Court. After the
attack on Pearl Harbor, the President and Congress authorized the
military to impose a curfew on Japanese-Americans, 337 and later a re-
location order 338 that sent tens of thousands of Japanese-American
citizens and resident aliens to concentration camps. 339 The Supreme
Court upheld these orders in Hirabayashi v. United States340 and Kore-
matsu v. United States.341 Justice Murphy, dissenting in Korematsu,
called the relocation order "racism," 342 a judgment that all three
335. 347 U.S. at 493-94 (Warren, C.J.).
336. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12 (Warren, C.J.). Chief Justice Warren stated that
"[there is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial
discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only
interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications
must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.
We have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of
citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry
solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause." Id.
337. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 88 (1943) (Stone, J.) (citing military
order of March 27, 1942, which provided that "all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all
alien Italians, and all persons of Japanese ancestry residing or being within the
geographical limits of Military Area No. 1 shall be within their place of residence between
the hours of 8:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M., which period is hereinafter referred to as the hours of
curfew.").
338. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215 (Black, J.) (considering the constitutionality of
Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 "which directed that after May 9, 1942, all persons of
Japanese ancestry should be excluded from that area [of the Western Command].").
339. See generally JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES (Peter Irons ed., 1989); see also Brant Lee, A Racial Trust: The Japanese
YWCA and the Alien Land Law, 7 AsIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 13-24 (describing the anti-
Japanese movement in California in the early 20th Century).
340. 320 U.S. 81 (upholding federal law which made it a crime to fail to comply with
military orders, as applied to an order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese descent).
341. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding federal law which made it a crime to fail to comply
with military relocation orders, as applied to orders directed at citizens and aliens of
Japanese descent).
342. See id. at 233 (Murphy, J.) ("This exclusion of 'all persons of Japanese ancestry,
both alien and non-alien,' from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the
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branches of the federal government have now acknowledged. 343 Fifty-
one years later, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena,344 Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, speaking for the Court, characterized the Roosevelt
Court's decision in Korematsu as "inexplicabl[e]" and quoted Justice
Murphy's remark.
345
The only good that emerged from Korematsu is that in that case
the Supreme Court ruled that racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny.346 The Supreme Court has applied this strict standard in
many cases to strike down racially discriminatory laws, such as in Lov-
ing v. Virginia,347 where the Supreme Court declared Virginia's law
prohibiting racial intermarriage to be unconstitutional. 348 The
Roosevelt Court established the principle of using strict scrutiny when
racial classifications are embedded in the law, even if the Roosevelt
Court itself failed to properly apply the principle in Hirabayashi and
Korematsu.
absence of martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over 'the very brink of
constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.").
343. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (reversing
Korematsu's conviction); Lorraine K. Bannai, Taking the Stand: The Stories of Three Men
Who Took the Japanese-American Internment to Court, 4 Seattle J. Soc. Jus. 1, 34 (stating
that "On August 10, 1988, President Reagan declared the internment a 'grave injustice' and
signed into law the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provided a formal apology and redress
of $20,000 to each surviving internee."); id. (describing how, upon presenting the
Presidential Medal of Freedom to Fred Korematsu in 1998, President Clinton stated, "In the
long history of our country's constant search for justice, some names of ordinary citizens
stand for millions of souls - Plessy, Brown, Parks. To that distinguished list today we add
the name of Fred Korematsu."); Karl Manheim & Allan Ides, The Unitary Executive, 29-Sep.
L.A. Lawyer 24 (2006) ("[Tjhe decision in Korematsu upholding the challenged internment
orders was eventually repudiated by all three branches of the U.S. government.").
344. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (ruling that strict scrutiny applied to a federal public
contracting minority set-aside program).
345. See id. at 215 n.* (O'Connor, J.). Justice O'Connor stated that "Justices Roberts,
Murphy, and Jackson filed vigorous dissents; Justice Murphy argued that the challenged
order 'falls into the ugly abyss of racism.' Congress has recently agreed with the dissenters'
position, and has attempted to make amends. See Pub.L. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903
("The Congress recognizes that . . . a grave injustice was done to both citizens and
permanent- resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation, and
internment of civilians during World War II")." Id. (O'Connor, J.).
346. See 323 U.S. at 216 (Black, J.). Justice Black stated, "[iut should be noted, to begin
with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is
to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Id.
347. 388 U.S. 1 (Warren, C.J.) ("At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands
that racial classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the 'most
rigid scrutiny ... .") (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (Black, J.)).
348. Id. at 12 (Warren, C.J.) ('There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to
marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
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IV. PRESENT-DAY JUDICIAL OPPOSITION TO THE REFORMS OF THE
ROOSEVELT COURT
The human rights advances that were achieved by the
Roosevelt Court have not been universally applauded. Two justices
who are currently members of the Supreme Court of the United States
- Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas - have fre-
quently expressed disagreement with the principles that the Roosevelt
Court established in each of the seven areas described above, and in
many cases these two justices would, if they could, turn back the clock
to a pre-1937 interpretation of the Constitution. Their opposing views
are set forth below, along with a defense of the positions that were
taken by the Roosevelt Court.
A. Substantive Due Process
The Roosevelt Court transformed the doctrine of Substantive
Due Process into a bulwark of protection for individual rights.349 Jus-
tice Scalia would jettison the entire concept of substantive due process,
and short of achieving that, he would limit its protection solely to activ-
ities that have always received constitutional protection.
Justice Scalia contends that the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee procedural rights only,
and not substantive rights. He has stated: "The text of the Due Pro-
cess Clause does not protect individuals against deprivations of liberty
simpliciter. It protects them against deprivations of liberty 'without
due process of law."' 350 He also maintains that if the Due Process
Clause is considered to protect substantive rights, that these rights
should be strictly limited to those freedoms which have been tradition-
ally respected by the majority of the people: "[iut is my position that the
term 'fundamental rights' should be limited to 'interest[s] traditionally
protected by our society .... ,'351 As understood by Justice Scalia, our
constitutional right to liberty is not only circumscribed by tradition,
but it is defined by tradition.
35 2
349. See supra text accompanying notes 136-69.
350. Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
351. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
352. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality
opinion) (setting forth theory that "fundamental rights" are defined by "specific,"
"particular" traditions). Justice Scalia stated that "[wie do not understand why, having
rejected our focus upon the societal tradition regarding the natural father's rights vis-&-vis a
child whose mother is married to another man, Justice Brennan would choose to focus
instead upon "parenthood." Why should the relevant category not be even more general -
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In contrast to Justice Scalia's position, the Supreme Court not
only still recognizes the principle of Substantive Due Process as out-
lined and protected by the Roosevelt Court,353 but it has also sought to
give meaning to the word "liberty." This word appears not only in the
Due Process Clauses of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but also figures prominently in the Preamble of the
Constitution, 354 the second sentence of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, 355 the writings of the founders, 356 and the speeches of Abraham
Lincoln. 35 7 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,358 Justice Douglas considered the
perhaps 'family relationships'; or 'personal relationships'; or even 'emotional attachments in
general'? Though the dissent has no basis for the level of generality it would select, we do:
We refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying
protection to, the asserted right can be identified. If, for example, there were no societal
tradition, either way, regarding the rights of the natural father of a child adulterously
conceived, we would have to consult, and (if possible) reason from, the traditions regarding
natural fathers in general. But there is such a more specific tradition, and it unqualifiedly
denies protection to such a parent .... [A] rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any
particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all." Id. (Scalia, J.).
353. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J.) (citing
Skinner and other cases, and stating that "[i]t is settled now, as it was when the Court
heard arguments in Roe v. Wade that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to
interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood.").
354. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ('We, the people of the United States, in order to ... secure
the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America.").
355. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (stating that all people are "endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness .... ").
356. See, e.g., Patrick Henry, Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death, March 23, 1775,
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/patrick.htm; THOMAS PAINE, COMMON
SENSE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN, AND OTHER ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 39 (1969)
("The new world hath been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and religious liberty
from every part of Europe."); The Sons of Liberty, http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/
related/sons.htm (describing the "Sons of Liberty", a revolutionary organization founded in
1765); Benjamin Franklin, Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One,
September 11, 1773, in FOUNDING AMERICA, DOCUMENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE BILL
OF RIGHTS (Jack N. Rakove, ed., 2006) [hereinafter FOUNDING AMERICA] ("We have
something left that is valuable; we have constitutional liberty both of person and of
conscience."); Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, July,
1774, in FOUNDING AMERICA 35 ("The god who gave us life, gave us liberty at the same time:
the hand of force may destroy, but cannot disjoin them."); Samuel Adams, On American
Independence, August 1, 1776, available at http://www.bartleby.com/268/8/18.html ("If ye
love wealth better than liberty, the tranquility of servitude than the animating contest for
freedom - go from us in peace."); Alexander Hamilton, The Farmer Refuted, February 23,
1775, available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/vlch3s5.html
(referring to "the natural rights of mankind" as including "the inviolable right to personal
liberty .... ").
357. See, e.g., ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at
Gettysburg (November 19, 1863), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 23 (Roy P.
Basler, ed., 1953), available at http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=Lincoln;idno=
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right of procreation to be a fundamental right of "liberty" because of its
supreme importance in the life of the individual.359 In Lawrence v.
Texas Justice Kennedy defined the word "liberty" broadly in describing
the concept of the Right to Privacy:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life.
360
Justice Scalia has characterized Justice Kennedy's description
of this core principle of freedom as "the sweet-mystery-of-life" pas-
sage. 361 In dismissing this portion of the Court's ruling from Lawrence,
Justice Scalia not only mocks the writing style of a colleague, but he
also belittles the concerns and passions that lie at the heart of people's
lives - whom they love, whom they live with, whom they marry, how
they raise their children, and how they choose to die.
Lincoln7 (follow "ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE DEDICATION OF THE CEMETERY AT
GETTYSBURG" hyperlink) ("Four score and seven years ago, our fathers brought forth on this
continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men
are created equal."). Lincoln also explained the centrality of the principle of "liberty" in the
following written fragment, possibly in response to a letter from Alexander Stephens, Vice-
President of the Confederacy, shortly before the commencement of the Civil War. Speaking
of the apparent success of the American experiment, Lincoln wrote: "All this is not the
result of accident. It has a philosophical cause. Without the Constitution and the Union,
we could not have attained the result; but even these, are not the primary cause of our great
prosperity. There is something back of these, entwining itself more closely about the human
heart. That something, is the principle of 'Liberty to all' - the principle that clears the path
for all - gives hope to all - and, by consequence, enterprise, and industry to all. The
expression of that principle, in our Declaration of Independence, was most happy, and
fortunate. Without this, as well as with it, we could have declared our independence of
Great Britain; but without it, we could not, I think, have secured our free government, and
consequent prosperity. No oppressed, people will fight, and endure, as our fathers did,
without the promise of something better, than a mere change of masters. The assertion of
that principle, at that time, was the word, 'fitly spoken' which has proved an 'apple of gold'
to us. The Union, and the Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed
around it. The picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the apple; but to adorn, and
preserve it. The picture was made for the apple - not the apple for the picture. So let us act,
that neither picture, or apple, shall ever be blurred, or bruised or broken [emphases
original]." Abraham Lincoln, Untitled letter (January 1861), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 168-69 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953).
358. 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942) (striking down Oklahoma law providing for the
sterilization of "habitual criminals").
359. See id. at 541 (Douglas, J.) ("There is no redemption for the individual whom the
law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is
forever deprived of a basic liberty."); See supra text accompanying note 162.
360. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J.).
361. See id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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By using "tradition" to determine what rights are fundamental,
Justice Scalia has an easy time disposing of Substantive Due Process
claims. Under Justice Scalia's approach, by definition all emerging
claims for justice or tolerance or fairness have no merit.362 Despite the
opposition mounted by Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, 363 the right
to privacy is now firmly established in American constitutional law.
The Constitution protects people's rights to marry,364 to live with ex-
tended family,365 to procreate, 366 to use contraception, 367 to terminate
a pregnancy prior to viability,368 to raise children,369 to enter homosex-
ual relationships,3 70 and to refuse lifesaving medical treatment.
371
None of these rights is absolute - each of them is subject to qualifica-
362. See id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that a state law criminalizing
sodomy is constitutional, and stating, ". . . an 'emerging awareness' is by definition not
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[s],' as we have said 'fundamental right'
status requires.").
363. See id. at 605-606 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion in Lawrence, and quoted Justice Potter Stewart's dissenting opinion in
Griswold, stating that the state law forbidding the use of contraceptives was "uncommonly
silly" but that the Constitution does not encompass a "general right to privacy." Id.
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527, 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
But see Roe, 410 U.S. at 167-71 (Stewart, J., concurring) (accepting Griswold's recognition of
the right to privacy as embodied in the word "liberty" of the 14th Amendment). Justice
Stewart changed his mind about the "right to privacy," and in Roe he stated that "[tihe
Constitution nowhere mentions a specific right of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life, but the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment covers more than those freedoms explicitly named in the Bill of Rights." Id. at
168 (Stewart, J., concurring).
364. See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (Warren, C.J.) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil
rights of man. . . .'") (quoting Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (Douglas, J.)).
365. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down
municipal "single-family" residential zoning ordinance insofar as it narrowly defined a
"single family" to exclude members of an extended family).
366. See Skinner, 316 U.S. 535 (striking down state law providing for the sterilization of
"habitual criminals.").
367. See Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (striking down state law forbidding use of
contraceptives, as applied to married couples); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438 (striking down state
law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptive devices to single persons).
368. See Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (striking down state law prohibiting abortion except to save
the life of the mother, and recognizing woman's constitutional right to terminate a
pregnancy up to the point of fetal viability); Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (reaffirming Roe).
369. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state law prohibiting
the teaching of foreign languages in the public schools before the 8th grade); Pierce v. Soc'y
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down state law prohibiting children from attending
private or parochial schools between the ages of 8 and 16); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57
(2000) (striking down state court visitation order granting paternal grandparents extensive
visitation rights over objection of mother, in the absence of a showing that mother was
unfit).
370. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 538 (striking down state law prohibiting persons from
engaging in sodomy).
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tion 372 - but following the principles established by the Roosevelt
Court, the Supreme Court has ruled that the government carries the
burden of proving that any restrictions of these rights are justified.373
The reason that the Supreme Court has recognized these rights is not
primarily because all of these rights have some grounding in "tradi-
tion,"374 but rather because all of these rights represent "intimate and
personal choices" that must be left to the individual. 375
If Justice Scalia had invoked the true American tradition of
"liberty," if he had acknowledged that in this frontier Nation the gov-
ernment did not traditionally intrude on people's private lives, if he
were faithful to the beliefs of the framers who were "Sons of Liberty"
and who, above all, were not beholden to tradition, then I could not
object to his use of "tradition" as the principal means of interpreting
the Constitution. However, in my opinion, Justice Scalia has confused
371. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (Rehnquist, C.J.) ("The principle that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.").
372. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("Although the
Connecticut birth-control law obviously encroaches upon a fundamental personal liberty,
the State does not show that the law serves any 'subordinating (state) interest which is
compelling' or that it is 'necessary ... to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."');
Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J.) ("Only where state
regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision does the
power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.");
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (upholding Missouri law requiring proof of clear
and convincing evidence of patient's desire to reject lifesaving nutrition and hydration, and
stating that "determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under the Due Process
Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respondent's constitutional rights have been
violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state
interests."' (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) and Mills v. Rogers, 457
U.S. 291, 299 (1982)).
373. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497-98 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (applying strict
scrutiny test because state law infringed a fundamental right); Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
at 153 n.4 (dictum) (Stone, J.) (opining that laws which infringe upon constitutional
freedoms should be subjected to "more searching judicial inquiry.").
374. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J.) ("Our prior cases make two
propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding
a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons,
concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce
offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as
married persons.") (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
375. See id. at 574 (Kennedy, J.) ("These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.") (quoting
Casey, 505 U.S. at 521 (O'Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ.)).
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the American tradition of liberty with specific religious traditions, such
as religious injunctions against abortion and homosexuality. Justice
Scalia has taken an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitu-
tion of the United States. There is room in this sacred oath for only
one "higher law."
B. Freedom of Expression
In the arena of freedom of expression, Justice Scalia has coura-
geously voted to protect the right of dissenters to express views that
society disapproves of. With Justice Thomas, however, it is a different
story.
In the last two decades, the two most important cases decided
by the Court on freedom of expression have been Texas v. Johnson
376
(the flag-burning case) and Virginia v. Black377 (the cross-burning
case). In these cases the Court ruled that statutes prohibiting flag
burning and cross burning were unconstitutional, 378 but for different
reasons.
In Texas v. Johnson, a majority of the Supreme Court, including
Justice Scalia, struck down a state statute that prohibited desecration
of the American flag because the law constituted a viewpoint based
restriction on people's right to freedom of expression 379 in violation of
the principle established in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette.38
0
In Virginia v. Black38 the Court found that a state law prohib-
iting cross-burning was unconstitutionally overbroad because it
376. 491 U.S. 397 (striking down Texas law which prohibited desecration of the
American flag).
377. 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding Virginia law which prohibited burning a cross with
the intent to intimidate someone, but striking down provision of law that made the act of
cross-burning "prima facie evidence" of intent to intimidate).
378. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399 and Black, 538 U.S. at 347-48.
379. See 491 U.S. at 414 (Brennan, J.) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
380. See id. at 415 (Brennan, J.) ("In holding in Barnette that the Constitution did not
leave this course open to the government, Justice Jackson described one of our society's
defining principles in words deserving of their frequent repetition: 'If there is any fixed star
in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.'") (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642
(Jackson, J.)).
381. 538 U.S. at 347-48 (upholding statute prohibiting burning a cross for the purpose of
intimidation, but striking down a provision making the burning of a cross prima facie
evidence of intent to intimidate).
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prohibited burning crosses as a political statement even in circum-
stances where there was no intent to threaten others. 38 2 The Court's
decision in Black is consistent with the Roosevelt Court's decision in
Terminiello. Terminiello stands for the proposition that statutes which
are overbroad on their face, in that they unduly infringe upon First
Amendment rights, are void and may not be used to prosecute anyone,
even people whose actions are not protected by the Constitution. 38 3
In summary, in Johnson the Supreme Court held that people
have the right to burn the American flag so long as they are not trying
to provoke violence, and in Black the Court ruled that people have the
right to burn a cross so long as they are not trying to intimidate any-
one. 38 4 Justice Thomas was not on the Court when Texas v. Johnson
was decided, but he dissented in Black,385 and his opinion displays a
profound disagreement with the First Amendment principles estab-
lished by the Roosevelt Court. In Black, Justice Thomas articulated a
view interpreting the meaning of the First Amendment that is diamet-
rically opposed to the principle that Justice Jackson expressed in
Barnette.386 Justice Thomas commenced his Black dissent with this
observation:
In every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what
outsiders can comprehend. That goes for both the sacred, see Texas
v. Johnson... (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (describing the unique
position of the American flag in our Nation's 200 years of history),
and the profane. I believe that cross burning is the paradigmatic
example of the latter.
38 7
In my opinion, Justice Thomas' use of a religious metaphor in
his dissenting opinion in Black is not a coincidence. Like Justice
Scalia's approach to resolving Substantive Due Process questions, Jus-
tice Thomas' approach to First Amendment problems is essentially
religious in nature. For Justice Thomas, the leading principle that
seems to guide his decision in a "symbolic speech" case is whether the
symbol that is being used is "sacred" or "profane." He appears to be-
lieve that the government may not only punish people for desecrating
382. Id. at 365 (O'Connor, J.) ("The act of burning a cross may mean that a person is
engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation. But that same act may mean only
that the person is engaged in core political speech. The prima facie evidence provision in
this statute blurs the line between these two meanings of a burning cross.").
383. See supra text accompanying notes 212-17.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 376-82.
385. 538 U.S. at 388-400 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
386. See id.
387. Id. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Vol. 2:1:1
2007 IN DEFENSE OF THE ROOSEVELT COURT 65
sacred objects and displaying profane objects, but that the government
also has the power to define what is "sacred" and what is "profane."
In vivid contrast to Justice Thomas' position is Justice Jack-
son's interpretation of the Constitution set forth in the "flag salute"
case, West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any
circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to
US.
3 8 8
Justice Thomas' position on freedom of expression is also incon-
sistent with the views of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis
Brandeis. Justice Holmes believed that America is a marketplace of
ideas,38 9 while Justice Brandeis reminded us that "[t]hose who won our
independence by revolution were not cowards,"39° and that they were
not afraid to allow the expression of dissenting views. 391
Justice Thomas considers the American flag to be a "sacred" ob-
ject and the burning cross to be a "profane" one,392 and from these
388. 319 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J.).
389. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("But when men have realized
that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day
we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.
While that experiment is part of our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant
against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the
lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country."), overruled in part by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444.
390. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (Brandeis, J.) ("Those who won our independence by
revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at
the cost of liberty. To courageous, selfreliant [sic] men, with confidence in the power of free
and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government, no danger
flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil
apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression. Such must be the rule if
authority is to be reconciled with freedom. Such, in my opinion, is the command of the
Constitution. It is therefore always open to Americans to challenge a law abridging free
speech and assembly by showing that there was no emergency justifying it.").
391. See id.
392. See Black, 538 U.S. at 388.
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assumptions he concludes that government may employ the criminal
law to protect the one and to ban the other.393 In light of Justice
Thomas' premises and conclusions, it would seem that the Constitution
would also allow the government to prosecute people who express ideas
that our society deems to be "profane" and that it could also prosecute
people for refusing to echo beliefs that our society deems to be "sacred."
Justice Thomas' narrow interpretation of our First Amendment right
to freedom of expression is contrary to the Holmes-Brandeis paradigm
of freedom of speech that has held sway since the time of the Roosevelt
Court.394 Justice Thomas' understanding of the First Amendment de-
serves to remain a minority view.
C. Freedom of Religion
The views of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas on freedom of
religion are fundamentally at odds with the principles that were estab-
lished by the Roosevelt Court in three respects. Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas reject the neutrality principle;395 they deny that the
Establishment Clause is effective against the States;396 and they offer
little protection to the Free Exercise of Religion. 397
The neutrality principle is the idea that government may
neither help nor may it hinder religion; instead it must act in a neutral
fashion towards religion. 398 The Supreme Court adopted the neutral-
393. See id.
394. Justice Thomas' opinion in Black radically departs from accepted First Amendment
doctrine in two other fundamental respects as well. He contends that the burning of a cross
is not "expression" but rather is "conduct." This contradicts the line of precedent
establishing the principle that symbolic speech is constitutionally protected. See Johnson,
491 U.S. at 404-406 (reviewing case law on expressive conduct and finding that burning the
American flag qualifies as expression which is subject to First Amendment protection.).
Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion also suggests that because knowledge of the victim's age
is not an element of a statutory rape case, that a person's intent should not be relevant in
First Amendment case. This ignores the fundamental principle making the speaker's intent
a central element of a First Amendment claim. See Scienter, Causation, and Harm, supra
note 201, at 183-85 (critiquing this aspect of Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion in Black).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 394-96 and infra text accompanying 398-409.
396. See infra text accompanying notes 410-26.
397. See infra text accompanying notes 427-34.
398. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612 (1971) (Burger, C.J.) (stating that under
the First Amendment the "principal or primary effect [of a law] must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion. . . ."); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that the Establishment Clause prohibits "government endorsement or disapproval
of religion."); McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring). ("The First
Amendment expresses our Nation's fundamental commitment to religious liberty by means
of two provisions-one protecting the free exercise of religion, the other barring
establishment of religion. They were written by the descendents of people who had come to
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ity principle as a postulate of American constitutional law in 1947 in
Everson v. Board of Education,399 and for sixty years this principle has
been the starting point for analysis under both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
Justice Antonin Scalia has belittled and mocked both this prece-
dent and the justices who issued it. In his dissenting opinion in
McCreary County v. ACLU, he characterized the neutrality principle
that was articulated in Everson as being based upon the "unsubstanti-
ated say-so" and "thoroughly discredited say-so" of the Roosevelt
Court, 40 0 and he concludes, "how can the Court possibly assert that
"the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between...
religion and nonreligion."40 1 He also quoted one commentator for the
proposition that the Roosevelt Court had been "sold . . . a bill of
goods." 40 2 Justice Scalia suggests that so long as the government en-
dorses all religions, and not a particular religion, that this does not
violate the Establishment Clause, because endorsing religion in gen-
eral is not the same as establishing one particular religion as an
official church. 4
0 3
The neutrality principle is squarely grounded in the text of the
Constitution and it is deeply rooted in the clear and repeatedly ex-
pressed intent of the founders of this Nation. The Preamble to the
Constitution does not invoke God or God's blessing.40 4 Instead, the
sovereign of this Nation is identified to be "We, the people of the
United States."40 5 Our Nation was not ordained by God nor does our
this land precisely so that they could practice their religion freely. Together with the other
First Amendment guarantees - of free speech, a free press, and the rights to assemble and
petition - the Religion Clauses were designed to safeguard the freedom of conscience and
belief that those immigrants had sought. They embody an idea that was once considered
radical: Free people are entitled to free and diverse thoughts, which government ought
neither to constrain nor to direct.").
399. See supra text accompanying notes 231-36.
400. 545 U.S. at 889-90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
401. Id. at 889 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 890 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The fountainhead of this jurisprudence,
Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, based its dictum that '[nleither a state nor the Federal
Government... can pass laws which... aid all religions,' on a review of historical evidence
that focused on the debate leading up to the passage of the Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty. A prominent commentator of the time remarked (after a thorough review of the
evidence himself) that it appeared the Court had been "sold . . . a bill of goods.") (citing
Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 3, 16 (1949)).
403. See id. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the "demonstrably false principle
that the government cannot favor religion over irreligion . .
404. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
405. Id.
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government arise from religious obligation. Instead our government
was erected upon the precept that "governments are instituted among
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."4 o6
The only reference to religion that is contained in the original Consti-
tution is the requirement that "no religious test shall ever be required
as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United
States."4
0 7
In America, the idea that the people are sovereign may be
traced back to the earliest colonial period. Roger Williams, who was
the founder of the colony of Rhode Island, battled the theocracy that
ran the Massachusetts Bay Colony.408 One of his principal arguments
against the religious leaders of the Massachusetts colony was that
their authority to govern the colony did not stem from God, but from
the people themselves. 40 9 In 1644, Williams wrote:
[T]he sovereign, original, and foundation of civil power lies in the
people.... This is clear not only in reason but in the experience of
all commonwealths where the people are not deprived of their natu-
ral freedom by the power of tyrants.410
The axiom that the powers of the government are derived, not
from God, but from the consent of the people, is a fundamental precept
of democracy, and it is the basis for the principle of the Separation of
Church and State.411 It is, therefore, no coincidence that Williams is
the author of the metaphor of "the wall of separation" between church
406. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
407. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
408. See JAMES ERNST, ROGER WILLIAMS, NEW ENGLAND FIREBRAND 61-137 (1932)
(describing Williams' conflict with the leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony up to the
time of his trial and banishment).
409. See PERRY MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMS: His CONTRIBUTION TO AMERICAN TRADITION
49 (1953) (quoting a contemporary criticizing Williams on the ground that his proposals
"would subject king and parliaments 'to the free will of the promiscuous multitude.'"); see
generally ERNST, supra note 413, at 199 (describing Williams' Initial Deed granting his
associates "liberty and equality in land and government."); id. at 264 (describing the Rhode
Island colony as "the first democratic commonwealth in modern times.").
410. MILLER, supra note 414, at 147 (quoting Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, of
Persecution, for cause of Conscience, discussed, in A Conference betweene Truth and Peace
(1644)).
411. See Iranian Government Constitution, English Text, http:/ /www.iranonline.com/
iran / iran-info /Government !constitution-1. html (setting forth the General Principles of the
Iranian Constitution, Article 2 of which states that "The Islamic Republic is a system based
on belief in (1) the One God (as stated in the phrase 'There is no god except Allah'), His
exclusive sovereignty and the right to legislate, and the necessity of submission to His
commands . . ").
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and state.412 In the same year that he declared "the people" to be sov-
ereign, Williams wrote: "[wihen they [the Church] have opened a gap
in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of the church
and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broke down the wall
itself,... and made His Garden a wilderness as it is this day."413
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison both considered the prin-
ciple of Separation of Church and State to be of fundamental
importance. In 1785, two years before the Constitution was written,
Madison fought the established church in Virginia over public funding
for religious education,414 and in 1786 he succeeded in persuading the
Virginia Legislature to adopt Jefferson's Act Establishing Religious
Freedom. 41 5 Both Madison and Jefferson expressed commitment to
the principle of Separation of Church and State, and they each consid-
ered this principle to have been enshrined in the Constitution by the
First Amendment. 41 6
412. See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1,
14, 52 (2006) (noting that Roger Williams coined the phrase "Wall of separation" between
church and state).
413. Id. at 52 n.173 (citing Roger Williams, Mr. Cottons Letter Lately Printed, Examined
and Answered (1644), reprinted in 1 The Complete Writings of Roger Williams 313, 392
(Russel & Russel, Inc. 1963)).
414. See James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
June 20, 1785, in FOUNDING AMERICA, supra note 356, at 294-301 ("[W]e hold it for a
fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator
and the manner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force
or violence.' The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of
every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate.").
415. See Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, January 16, 1786, in
FOUNDING AMERICA, supra note 356, at 301-303 ("Almighty God hath created the mind free.
All attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burdens are a departure from the
plan of the Holy Author of our religion. No man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship or ministry or shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief, but all men shall be free to profess and by argument to maintain, their
opinions in matters of religion.").
416. See James Madison, Letter to Robert Walsh, March 2, 1819, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 1808-1819, 432 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1908), (advocating "the total separation
of the church from the state."); Arlen Specter, Defending the Wall: Maintaining ChurchI
State Separation in America, 18 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 575, 580 (1995) (quoting an undated
essay by James Madison as stating, "strongly guarded... [is the] separation of religion and
government in the Constitution of the United States.")); James Madison, Letter to Edward
Livingston, July 10, 1822, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1819-1836, 98, 102
(Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1910) (disapproving of Congress' appointment of chaplains, and stating,
"a perfect separation between the ecclesiastical and civil matters is of importance."); James
Madison, Letter to Rev. Jasper Adams, 1832, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1819-
1836, 487 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., 1910) ("I must admit moreover that it may not be easy, in
every possible case, to trace the line of separation between the rights of religion and the civil
authority with such distinctness as to avoid collisions and doubts on unessential points.
The tendency to a usurpation on one side or the other or to a corrupting coalition or alliance
between them will be best guarded against by entire abstinence of the government from
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Furthermore, the plain language of the Establishment Clause is
inconsistent with the position taken by Justice Scalia that the Consti-
tution permits the government to endorse religion. The First
Amendment does not prohibit "the establishment of a religion."
417
Rather, it prohibits the "establishment of religion."418 In a very careful
and thorough review of the history of the drafting of the First Amend-
ment, Justice Souter has demonstrated that this language was
deliberately chosen, and that the framers rejected proposed versions of
the Establishment Clause that would have merely prohibited the gov-
ernment from preferring one religion over another.
419
Justice Thomas not only agrees with Justice Scalia that the
neutrality principle should be overruled, but he also takes the position,
contrary to the decisions of the Roosevelt Court in Cantwell and Ever-
son, that the Establishment Clause is not applicable to the States.
420
His primary argument is that the framers of the Bill of Rights did not
view the Establishment Clause as protecting the right of the individual
to freedom of religion, but rather that they adopted the Establishment
interference in any way whatever, beyond the necessity of preserving public order and
protecting each sect against trespasses on its legal rights by others."); Thomas Jefferson,
Letter to Danbury Baptist Association, January 1, 1802, at Library of Congress, The Thomas
Jefferson Papers, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson-papers/index.html
(search "Search this collection" for "Danbury Baptist"; follow "Thomas Jefferson to Danbury,
Connecticut, Baptist Association, January 1, 1802, with Copy" hyperlink under "Item Ti-
tles"). Jefferson explained: "[blelieving with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man & his god, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and state .... Ad-
hering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of
conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend
to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to
his social duties."
417. U.S. CONST. amend. I [emphasis added].
418. Id. [emphasis added].
419. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-16 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)
(describing in detail the drafting history of the Establishment Clause); id. at 616 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (concluding that "history neither contradicts nor warrants reconsideration of
the settled principle that the Establishment Clause forbids support for religion in general
no less than support for one religion or some.").
420. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("I accept that the Free Exercise Clause, which clearly protects
an individual right, applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. But
the Establishment Clause is another matter. The text and history of the Establishment
Clause strongly suggest that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from
interfering with state establishments. Thus, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which does
protect an individual right, it makes little sense to incorporate the Establishment Clause.").
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Clause to protect the established churches of the States from federal
interference.
421
Justice Thomas' contention that the aspect of freedom of relig-
ion that is protected by the Establishment Clause does not constitute a
"fundamental right" is rebutted by the obvious structure of the Consti-
tution and the overwhelming historical evidence regarding the intent
of the framers. The Establishment Clause is not contained in Article I,
Section 9 of the Constitution,422 which details a number of limitations
on the powers of the federal government, but rather it is the first of our
liberties that is enumerated in the Bill of Rights.423 The Supreme
Court has without exception construed the Establishment Clause as
one of the fundamental rights of American citizens.424 Furthermore, it
is abundantly clear that Roger Williams, James Madison, and Thomas
Jefferson considered the principles of the Establishment Clause to be a
fundamental human right.425 The framers of the Constitution re-
421. See id. at 49-51 (analyzing the text of the Establishment Clause and citing the
existence of established churches in some states at the time the Establishment Clause was
adopted).
422. U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.").
423. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
424. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("I accept ... the proposition
that the Fourteenth Amendment has somehow absorbed the Establishment Clause,
although it is not without irony that a constitutional provision evidently designed to leave
the States free to go their own way should now have become a restriction upon their
autonomy."); id. at 254-58 (Brennan, J., concurring) (rebutting contention that the
Establishment Clause was not incorporated into the 14th Amendment).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 403-407; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256 (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("It has also been suggested that the 'liberty' guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment logically cannot absorb the Establishment Clause because that clause is not
one of the provisions of the Bill of Rights which in terms protects a 'freedom' of the
individual."); see EDWARD S. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE
(1951), 113-16 ("The fallacy in this contention, I think, is that it underestimates the role of
the Establishment Clause as a coguarantor, with the Free Exercise Clause, of religious
liberty. The Framers did not entrust the liberty of religious beliefs to either clause alone.
The Free Exercise Clause 'was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of
freedom from governmental intrusion in matters of faith."') (quoting McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 464 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.)); see also McGowan, 366 U.S. at 464-65
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("In assuring the free exercise of religion, the Framers of the
First Amendment were sensitive to the then recent history of those persecutions and
impositions of civil disability with which sectarian majorities in virtually all of the Colonies
had visited deviation in the matter of conscience. This protection of unpopular creeds,
however, was not to be the full extent of the Amendment's guarantee of freedom from
governmental intrusion in matters of faith. The battle in Virginia, hardly for years won,
where James Madison had led the forces of disestablishment in successful opposition to
Patrick Henry's proposed Assessment Bill levying a general tax for the support of Christian
teachers, was a vital and compelling memory in 1789. The lesson of that battle, in the
words of Jefferson's Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, whose passage was its verbal
embodiment, was 'that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
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garded the official establishment of religion as a great social wrong,
and they prohibited the federal government from engaging in the prac-
tice because it amounts to an infringement upon freedom of religion.426
Another fundamental error that Justice Thomas makes in this
regard is that, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, the rele-
vant timeframe is not 1787-1791, but rather 1866-1868.427 The
Congress drafted and adopted the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866,
and the people ratified it in 1868, amending the original
Constitution.
428
The available evidence from that period sheds little light upon
the intent of framers of the Fourteenth Amendment specifically re-
garding the Establishment Clause, for the simple reason that our
society was, at that time, grappling with a different set of problems.
The States which had lately been in rebellion were violating the funda-
mental rights of black citizens in a number of respects, and the
separation of church and state was not an immediate concern.429 Sen-
ator Jacob Howard, introducing the Fourteenth Amendment to the
floor of Congress, specifically stated that the Amendment would
protect:
the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight
amendments to the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech and
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even the forcing
him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the
comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals he
would make his pattern, and whose powers he feels most persuasive to righteousness, and is
withdrawing from the ministry those temporal rewards, Which proceeding from an
approbation of their personal conduct, are an additional incitement to earnest and
unremitting labours for the instruction of mankind.' What Virginia had long practiced, and
what Madison, Jefferson and others fought to end, was the extension of civil government's
support to religion in a manner which made the two in some degree interdependent, and
thus threatened the freedom of each. The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to
assure that the national legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely
religious end; that it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of the Colonies had done, make
of religion, as religion, an object of legislation.").
426. See U.S. CONST. pmbl.; McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 889-90, 890 n.2, 893;
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 464-65; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 256; CORWIN, supra note 431.
427. See Richard L. Aynes, The Continuing Importance of Congressman John A.
Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 589, 591 (2003) (characterizing
the life and words of Congressman John Bingham as relevant to the "original intent,
meaning, or understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
428. See id. at 589 (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment was "first proposed in 1866
and declared ratified in 1868.").
429. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 255 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe last of the formal
state establishments was dissolved more than three decades before the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified, and thus the problem of protecting official state churches from
federal encroachments could hardly have been any concern of those who framed the post-
Civil War Amendments.").
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of the press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble and peti-
tion the government for a redress of grievances, a right pertaining
to each and all the people; the right to keep and bear arms; the
right to be exempt from the quartering of soldiers in a house with-
out the consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and from any search or seizure
except by virtue of a warrant issued upon a formal oath or affidavit;
the right of an accused person to be informed of the nature of the
accusation against him, and his right to be tried by an impartial
jury of the vicinage; and also the right to be secure against exces-
sive bail and against cruel and unusual punishments.
430
Senator Howard does not mention the Establishment Clause in the
foregoing passage, but this does not seem to be a deliberate omission.
Neither does he mention the right to the free exercise of religion,431 the
right to remain silent,432 the right to an attorney,433 the right to com-
pel the production of evidence, 434 the right to confront adverse
witnesses, 435 and the right to a speedy and public trial,436 all of which
are now considered fundamental. 437
Like Senator Howard, Representative John Bingham, the prin-
cipal author of the Fourteenth Amendment,43s specifically stated that
the Amendment incorporates the first eight amendments of the Consti-
430. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 2765 (May 23, 1866).
431. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion] .... ").
432. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person .. , shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself. .. ").
433. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
434. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . ").
435. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... ").
436. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial .. ").
437. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating 6th
Amendment right to counsel into the Due Process Clause of 14th Amendment); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incorporating 5th Amendment right to be free of compelled self-
incrimination into the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating the 6th Amendment right to confrontation of opposing
witnesses into the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating 6th Amendment right to a speedy and public trial into
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)
(incorporating 6th Amendment right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses into the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(incorporating 1st Amendment right to free exercise of religion into the Due Process Clause
of the 14th Amendment).
438. See On Misreading John Bingham, supra note 75, at 58 (referring to Bingham as
"the principal author of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment").
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tution, and to make his point crystal clear he read the provisions of the
first eight amendments, including the Establishment Clause, into the
legislative record. 439 Justice Thomas has failed to cite any evidence
from the history of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in sup-
port of the proposition that the framers did not intend to incorporate
the Establishment Clause.
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have mounted yet another
attack upon freedom of religion, and in this third respect they have
been successful. In Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources of Oregon v. Smith, Justice Scalia, with the supporting votes of
Justice Thomas and three other justices, dramatically narrowed the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause. 440 In an opinion authored by Justice
Scalia, the Supreme Court held in Smith that "laws of general applica-
tion" do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
even though they prohibit behavior that is ordained by a particular
religion.441 The Court applied this principle in the Smith case to rule
that the State of Oregon could constitutionally apply a law prohibiting
the possession or use of peyote to a person who ingested peyote as part
of a ritual of the Native American Church.442 Presumably, the Smith
case means that it is equally constitutional for the government to
adopt and enforce laws of general application that force people to en-
gage in other behavior that is contrary to their religious principles,
such as engaging in military combat. 443
439. See Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess, Appendix 84 (March 31, 1871) ("Mr.
Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by the first section,
fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may be more fully understood, permit me to say
that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished
from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.").
440. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding administrative determination that drug counselors
who ingested peyote as a sacrament of the Native American Church had been terminated
for "misconduct," thus disqualifying them for unemployment compensation).
441. See id. at 886 (Scalia, J.) ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable
prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public
policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious
objector's spiritual development."') (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
442. See id. at 890 (Scalia, J.) ("Because respondents' ingestion of peyote was prohibited
under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent
with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their
dismissal results from use of the drug.").
443. See Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified
Theory of First Amendment Exceptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 Mo.
L. REV. 9, 35 (2001) ("The Supreme Court has never held that the Constitution requires an
exemption from compulsory military service to those who are opposed to participation in
war. Yet every conscription statute ever enacted by Congress has contained some type of
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At first glance, it might seem ironical that justices who utilize a
"religious" approach to interpreting the Constitution4 would give
short shrift to freedom of religion. However, the narrow interpretation
of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause that Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas have adopted is perfectly consistent with
the fact that their interpretations of other provisions of the Constitu-
tion coincide with longstanding religious traditions. The positions that
they have taken in their interpretation of the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause allow the government to discriminate
against minority religions. 445 In the view of these Justices, the govern-
ment is free to endorse religion, and the government is free to adopt
laws of general application that interfere with the exercise of specific
religions, because religious groups are free to participate in the politi-
cal process and to seek to achieve legal acceptance of their religious
views. 446 Of course, it would be theoretically possible for the legisla-
ture to adopt a law that endorses a minority religion, or that
persecutes a religious sect that the majority of the people belong to.
However, as a practical matter this will never occur; it is highly un-
likely that a county government would exercise its authority to install
Hindu statuary around a courthouse, or that a state legislature would
prohibit Christian churches from serving wine at communion. Consti-
tutional protection for freedom of religion, as a practical matter,
exemption."). See also Paul M. Landskroener, Not the Smallest Grain of Incense: Free
Exercise and Conscientious Objection to Draft Registration, 25 VAL. U.L. REV. 455, 475-81
(1991) (contending that the Free Exercise Clause protects conscientious objectors).
444. See supra text following note 375 and text accompanying notes 385-90.
445. See Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice Scalia, 24 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 427, 433 (1997) (responding to Justice Scalia, and stating that persons who adhere
to a narrow interpretation of the Establishment Clause possess "insufficient consciousness
of the adverse impact that such narrow views have on Jews and other religious
minorities."); David Goldberger, Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinnette:
Beware of Justice Scalia's Per Se Rule, 6 GEo. MASON L. REV. 1, 22 (1997) (criticizing Justice
Scalia's opinion in Smith, stating that "[alithough the political majority could be expected to
ignore the interests and needs of religious minorities, Scalia was unmoved."); Renee
Skinner, Note: The Church of Lukui Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah: Still Sacrificing
Free Exercise, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 259, 276 (1994) ("[T]he democratic process leaves religious
minorities woefully unprotected despite Scalia's assertions to the contrary.").
446. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J.) ("[Lleaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred
to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs."); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses, 22 U. HAw. L. REV. 449, 466 (2000) ("Justice
Scalia's approach to the Religion Clauses - favoring weak enforcement of free exercise
exemptions and establishment prohibitions alike - would treat religion as a garden-variety
interest group, participating in the political process just like any other lobby.").
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protects religious minorities, and when this protection vanishes, it is
the religious minorities who are affected. The Roosevelt Court was
aware of this danger and was determined to protect against it; Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas are content to consign religious minorities
to the majoritarian political process.
44 7
D. Commerce Clause
Justice Clarence Thomas believes that the Supreme Court took
a "wrong turn" in 1937 when it developed the Affectation Doctrine,
thus expanding Congress' power under the Commerce Clause to regu-
late the nation's economy. 448 He also believes that Court ought to cut
back the scope of Congress' power to enact legislation affecting com-
merce. 449  If the Court were to reverse direction and repeal the
447. See Philip Spare, Comment: Free Exercise of Religion: A New Translation, 96 DICK.
L. REV. 705, 722-23 (1992) (comparing the views of Justice Robert Jackson and Justice
Antonin Scalia on the duty to protect religious minorities from the political process). Mr.
Spare first quoted the words of Justice Jackson: "The very purpose of a bill of rights was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of the majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to
be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections. " Id. (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638). Spare concluded, "Justice
Jackson's words stand in sharp contrast to Justice Scalia's assertion that placing religious
minorities at 'a relative disadvantage . . . [is an] unavoidable consequence of democratic
government."' Id. at 723 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (Scalia, J.)).
448. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 599 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). ("As
recently as 1936, the Court continued to insist that the Commerce Clause did not reach the
wholly internal business of the States. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308
(1936) (Congress may not regulate mine labor because "[tihe relation of employer and
employee is a local relation"); see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 543-50 (1935) (holding that Congress may not regulate intrastate sales of sick
chickens or the labor of employees involved in intrastate poultry sales). The Federal
Government simply could not reach such subjects regardless of their effects on interstate
commerce. These cases all establish a simple point: From the time of the ratification of the
Constitution to the mid-1930s, it was widely understood that the Constitution granted
Congress only limited powers, notwithstanding the Commerce Clause. Moreover, there was
no question that activities wholly separated from business, such as gun possession, were
beyond the reach of the commerce power. If anything, the 'wrong turn' was the Court's
dramatic departure in the 1930s from a century and a half of precedent.").
449. See id. at 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In an appropriate case, I believe
that we must further reconsider our "substantial effects" test with an eye toward
constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the Commerce Clause without
totally rejecting our more recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence."). Justice Thomas and
Justice Scalia would also overturn the "dormant commerce clause" doctrine and return to a
pre-1937 understanding of the power of the States to regulate interstate commerce. See
United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.Ct. 1786,
1799 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The negative Commerce Clause has
no basis in the Constitution and has proved unworkable in practice .... Because this Court
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Affectation Doctrine, it would revoke Congress' power to deal with fun-
damental economic issues such as collective bargaining or
environmental protection. 450 Even federal laws prohibiting child labor
would be unconstitutional if the Court were to return to its pre-1937
understanding of the Commerce Clause.451
Justice Thomas' position on the Commerce Clause is set forth
most fully in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lopez, 452 where
he argues that the Framers understood "commerce" to be distinct from
manufacturing or farming, 453 and cites the Court's 1895 decision in
United States v. E.C. Knight Co. ,454 which drew the same distinction in
the course of striking down a federal antitrust law.455 However, Jus-
tice Thomas overlooks the fact that the Framers did not foresee the
emergence of a highly integrated national economy. The Supreme
Court changed course in 1937 because it realized that as commerce
among the states expands, Congress' power to regulate "commerce
among the several states" also expands. 45 6 When labor conditions, en-
has no policy role in regulating interstate commerce, I would discard the Court's negative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence."); id. at 1798 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) ("'[T]he so-
called 'negative' Commerce Clause is an unjustified judicial invention, not to be expanded
beyond its existing domain .... The historical record provides no grounds for reading the
Commerce Clause to be other than what it says - an authorization for Congress to regulate
commerce."') (citations omitted).
450. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (adopting the Affectation Doctrine to
uphold the National Labor Relations Act against a challenge under the Commerce Clause);
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (invoking
Affectation Doctrine to uphold the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
against a challenge under the Commerce Clause).
451. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (striking down federal law
prohibiting child labor).
452. 514 U.S. at 584-602 (Thomas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the interpretation of
the Commerce Clause should be "tempered" in light of the invalidation of a federal law
prohibiting the possession of firearms within 1000 feet of schools).
453. See id. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he term 'commerce' was used in
contradistinction to productive activities such as manufacturing and agriculture.").
454. 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (ruling that Congress lacked authority under the Commerce
Clause to enact antitrust law applicable to the manufacture of sugar).
455. See id. at 14 (drawing distinction between commerce on the one hand and
"manufactures . .. ., agriculture, horticulture, stock-raising, domestic fisheries, [and]
mining" on the other) (citation omitted).
456. See Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 152 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.)
("From generation to generation fresh vindication is given to the prophetic wisdom of the
framers of the Constitution in casting it in terms so broad that it has adaptable vitality for
the drastic changes in our society which they knew to be inevitable, even though they could
not foresee them. Thus it has come to be that the transforming consequences resulting from
the pervasive industrialization of life find the Commerce Clause appropriate, for instance,
for national regulation of an aircraft flight wholly within a single state. Such exertion of
power by the national government over what might seem a purely local transaction would,
as a matter of abstract law, have been as unimaginable to Marshall as to Jefferson precisely
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vironmental conditions, or the safety of products that are produced in
one part of our Nation affect people and businesses throughout our Na-
tion, then the regulation of economic matters becomes a matter of
national concern. 457 Justice Thomas in effect advocates a return to
what Franklin Roosevelt characterized as "the horse and buggy defini-
tion of interstate commerce."458 Justice Thomas would overturn the
informed decisions of the Justices of the Roosevelt Court, who had
first-hand experience with the social problems of a nationwide eco-
nomic depression, and who established an unbroken line of precedent
upholding the Affectation Doctrine stretching back over 70 years.
E. State Action
In 2001 in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association,459 the Supreme Court ruled that the action of the
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association constituted "state ac-
tion."460 Schools that belonged to the Association were permitted to
compete only against other member schools. 461 Virtually all of the
because neither could have foreseen the present conquest of the air by man. But law,
whether derived from acts of Congress or the Constitution, is not an abstraction. The
Constitution cannot be applied in disregard of the external circumstances in whch [sic] men
live and move and have their being.").
457. See id.; See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 251 (Clark, J.) ("[Tihe fact that
certain kinds of businesses may not in 1875 have been sufficiently involved in interstate
commerce to warrant bringing them within the ambit of the commerce power is not
necessarily dispositive of the same question today. Our populace had not reached its
present mobility, nor were facilities, goods and services circulating as readily in interstate
commerce as they are today. Although the principles which we apply today are those first
formulated by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, the conditions of transportation
and commerce have changed dramatically, and we must apply those principles to the
present state of commerce. The sheer increase in volume of interstate traffic alone would
give discriminatory practices which inhibit travel a far larger impact upon the Nation's
commerce than such practices had on the economy of another day.")
458. NEW DEAL, supra note 17, at 145 (quoting Roosevelt). See HocKErr, supra note 1,
at 233 (quoting Justice Jackson as stating that, prior to 1937, the members of the Supreme
Court "were not open to conviction that conditions had changed. They were striking down a
good deal of legislation on the basis of what conditions were when they were brought up on
the frontier.").
459. 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (finding the action of a private nonprofit athletic association to
be "state action").
460. See id. at 298 (Souter, J.) ("[Tihe 'necessarily fact-bound inquiry' leads to the
conclusion of state action here.") (citation omitted); id. at 302 (Souter, J.) ("The
entwinement down from the State Board is therefore unmistakable, just as the
entwinement up from the member public schools is overwhelming. Entwinement will
support a conclusion that an ostensibly private organization ought to be charged with a
public character and judged by constitutional standards; entwinement to the degree shown
here requires it.").
461. Id. at 291.
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public schools in the State belonged to the Association, 46 2 and public
schools accounted for 84% of the membership of the Association.
463
The Association's governing boards were comprised of principals, assis-
tant principals, and superintendents from member schools, and these
boards met during school hours.464 The staff members of the organiza-
tion were permitted to enroll in the state public employees' pension
program. 465 Between 1972 and 1996, the State Board of Education,
invoking its statutory authority, designated the TSSAA as the organi-
zation to regulate interscholastic athletics in the public schools. 466 In
light of these and other facts, the Supreme Court ruled that the deci-
sion of the TSSAA prohibiting member schools from exercising "undue
influence" in recruiting athletes 467 was "state action" because the or-
ganization was "pervasively entwined" with the state government.
468
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented in Brent-
wood Academy and contended that the action of the TSSAA did not
constitute state action. 469 His fundamental error is his contention that
by narrowly construing what constitutes "state action" and finding
that the conduct of the TSSAA constitutes "private action," he is
thereby protecting "individual freedom."470 To state this argument is
to refute it. One might just as well argue that if the Roosevelt Court in
Smith v. Allwright471 had found the action of the Democratic Party in
refusing to admit blacks was "private action" not subject to constitu-





466. Id. at 292.
467. See id. (Souter, J.) ("The Association's board of control found that Brentwood
violated a rule prohibiting 'undue influence' in recruiting athletes, when it wrote to
incoming students and their parents about spring football practice.").
468. See id. at 298 (Souter, J.) ("The nominally private character of the Association is
overborne by the pervasive entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its
composition and workings, and there is no substantial reason to claim unfairness in
applying constitutional standards to it."); see supra note 444.
469. See id. at 305-15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
470. See id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The majority's holding - that the
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association's (TSSAA) enforcement of its recruiting
rule is state action - not only extends state-action doctrine beyond its permissible limits but
also encroaches upon the realm of individual freedom that the doctrine was meant to
protect.").
471. 321 U.S. 649 (striking down the rule of the State Democratic Party excluding
blacks from membership, and therefore excluding them from voting in primary elections).
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"individual freedom" in America, or that if in Marsh v. Alabama472 the
Gulf Shipbuilding Company had been permitted to exclude Jehovah's
Witnesses from the company town of Chickasaw, that this would have
expanded the "individual freedom" of Americans. It is undeniable that
in the context of those cases the Democratic Party had no constitu-
tional right to discriminate on the basis of race and that the Gulf
Shipbuilding Company had no constitutional right to prevent the re-
sidents of its town from hearing religious dissenters. 473 There may be
good reasons not to subject the Democratic Party or the Gulf Shipbuild-
ing Company or the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
to the requirements of the Constitution, but the protection of "individ-
ual freedom" is not one of them.
474
The crabbed interpretation of the State Action Doctrine favored
by Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia would insulate powerful private
interests that are exercising a measure of governmental power from
the demands of the Constitution. The underlying constitutional policy
being promoted by Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia in this context
favors the strong against the weak. In my opinion, this is precisely
contrary to the conception of government held by Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and the justices whom he appointed.
47 5
F. Separation of Powers
One of the greatest achievements of the Roosevelt Court was its
decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,476 where the
Court ruled that even in wartime, the President must obey the law.
4 77
As noted above, Justice Robert Jackson - who had served as Chief
Prosecutor at Nuremburg - rejected a definitional approach to separa-
tion of powers, and instead developed a subtle yet powerful test for
472. 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (finding the conduct of a company-owned town in arresting a
Jehovah's Witness for trespassing on a sidewalk to be "state action").
473. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) ("[A]cts of invidious discrimination
.... are entitled to no constitutional protection.").
474. See Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic
Choice, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1379 (2006) (proposing that the purpose of the state action
doctrine is not to protect individual freedom but rather to leave the regulation of purely
private parties up to the democratic process).
475. See supra text accompanying note 10-13, 241-42; 248-49.
476. 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (striking down Executive Order taking control of the steel
industry to prevent a work stoppage).
477. Id. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) ('With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government
except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary
deliberations.").
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measuring the extent of Presidential power. Justice Jackson's ap-
proach used a spectrum, where the power of the President to act
depends on the extent to which such an act has been authorized by
Congress or the Constitution.
478
The unilateral actions of President George W. Bush in his con-
duct of the War on Terror have given rise to myriad constitutional
questions. Does the President have the power to detain suspected ter-
rorists in military prisons at Guantanamo Bay without trial?479 Does
the President have the power to order the trial and punishment of sus-
pected terrorists before military commissions of his own design?480
Does the President have the authority to order the C.I.A. to operate
secret prisons holding thousands of prisoners for interrogation, and to
order that these prisoners be tortured?4 l Does the President have the
authority to order the N.S.A. to eavesdrop on the international tele-
phone calls and e-mails of American citizens without a warrant?4 8 2
The Attorney General for the current administration has ex-
pressly claimed that the President has the unilateral authority to
conduct warrantless surveillance of American citizens in direct disobe-
dience to federal law because the Constitution vests in the President
the duty to protect this country and its citizens. 48 3 Furthermore, in
478. See supra text accompanying notes 113-32, 297-306.
479. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (ruling that the President lacks the authority to
indefinitely detain United States citizens in military prisons at Guantanamo Bay as "enemy
combatants," and ruling that determinations of enemy combatant status must be in
accordance with the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process).
480. See, e.g., Richard J. Wilson, Military Commissions in Guantanamo Bay: Giving
"Full and Fair Trial" a Bad Name, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 63 (2006-2007) ("Military
commissions are this administration's version of TEGWAR [The Exciting Game Without
Any Rules].").
481. Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power:
Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1294 (2006) ("[It may be time to
rethink the longstanding historical prejudice against judicial engagement in matters of
national security."); Elizabeth Sepper, The Ties That Bind: How the Constitution Limits the
CIA's Actions in the War on Terror, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1805, 1843 (2006) ("Ultimately, the
Constitution simply does not permit our government to engage in indefinite detention or
torture, no matter the end.").
482. Katherine Wong, The NSA Terrorist Surveillance Program, 43 HARv. J. ON LEGIS.
517 (2006) (discussing legality and constitutionality of government program of warrantless
eavesdropping on the international emails and telephone calls of Americans); John Cary
Sims, What the NSA Is Doing.. . And Why It's Illegal, 33 HAsTINGS L.Q. 105 (2006) (same).
483. See generally U.S. Department of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the
Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President, 3, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf, (stating that if FISA were
interpreted as prohibiting the President's Terrorist Surveillance Program, "FISA would be
unconstitutional as applied to this narrow context."). Id. at 35 ("FISA would be
unconstitutional as applied to the current conflict if the canon of constitutional avoidance
could not be used to head off a collision between the Branches.").
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dozens of "signing statements," the current President has claimed that
he has the authority to disobey hundreds of laws that he has signed.
4 4
For example, both when he signed a law requiring him to make reports
sharing foreign intelligence with Congress and when he signed a law
prohibiting the torture of detainees, the President stated that he would
construe those laws "in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive
branch."
48 5
From his opinions in Hamdi and Hamdan, it appears that Jus-
tice Thomas wholeheartedly and without reservation agrees with the
President on this point.48 6 This is contrary to what Justice Black saw
in the text of the Constitution,48 7 it is contrary to what Justice Frank-
484. See Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Power of
His Office, Boston Globe, April 30, 2006, at Al ("President Bush has quietly claimed the
authority disobey more than 750 laws enacted since he took office, asserting that he has the
power to set aside any statute passed by Congress when it conflicts with his interpretation
of the Constitution."); Note: Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements,
120 HARv. L. REV. 597, 601 (2006) (proposing that signing statements should be considered
by courts when interpreting statutes, but disapproving of statements that are used for the
"more controversial purpose" of claiming that the statute being signed is unconstitutional
and will not be enforced).
485. See T. J. Halstead, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and
Institutional Implications 12, Congressional Research Service, September 17, 2007,
("Contributing to the controversy has been the high profile of several of the provisions that
have been objected to by President Bush. For instance, in the signing statement
accompanying the USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, President
Bush declared that provisions requiring the Executive Branch to submit reports and audits
to Congress would be construed 'in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional
authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold information the
disclosure of which could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties.'
Likewise, in the signing statement accompanying the law that contained the McCain
Amendment (as part of the Detainee Treatment Act) prohibiting the use of torture, or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, the President declared that the Executive
Branch would construe that provision "in a manner consistent with the constitutional
authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in
Chief . . . [in order to protect] the American people from further terrorist attacks."),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf.
486. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Executive Branch,
acting pursuant to the powers vested in the President by the Constitution and with explicit
congressional approval, has determined that Yaser Hamdi is an enemy combatant and
should be detained. This detention falls squarely within the Federal Government's war
powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision."); Hamdan,
126 S.Ct. 2749, 2823 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the decision of the
Court overturning the military commissions established by the President to try detainees
for war crimes, and stating that the opinion of the majority "openly flouts our well-
established duty to respect the Executive's judgment in matters of military operations and
foreign affairs."). Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas' opinion in Hamdan.
487. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
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furter remembered from our nation's traditions,4s s and it is contrary to
what Justice Jackson revealed as the purpose of the doctrine of Sepa-
ration of Powers. 48 9 As John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison,490
ours "is a government of laws, and not of men. '4 91 Justice Thomas
would place the President above the law.
G. Equal Protection
As previously noted, in the Railway Express Agency case, Jus-
tice Robert Jackson expressed the core principle of the Equal
Protection Clause as prohibiting the .government from treating groups
of people differently unless there are "real differences" between
them.
4 92
Justice Scalia does not agree with this basic, fundamental prin-
ciple. Instead, just as he interprets the Due Process Clause to mean
that our fundamental rights are limited to "traditional" rights, Justice
Scalia concludes that under the Equal Protection Clause the govern-
ment is permitted to treat people differently so long as, traditionally,
they have been treated differently. In United States v. Virginia493 Jus-
tice Scalia stated:
[Ilt is my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to de-
vise [under the Equal Protection Clause], they cannot supersede -
and indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect - those constant and
unbroken national traditions that embody the people's understand-
ing of ambiguous constitutional texts. More specifically, it is my
view that "when a practice not expressly prohibited by the text of
the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open,
widespread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning
of the Republic, we have no proper basis for striking it down."494
488. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
489. See supra text accompanying notes 123-32.
490. 5 U.S. 137.
491. Id. at 163 (Marshall, C.J.) ("The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested
legal right.").
492. 336 U.S. 106, 116 (Jackson, J.) (upholding municipal ordinance prohibiting the
operation of motor vehicles purely for the purpose of advertising on the ground that "there is
a real difference between doing in self-interest and doing for hire .... "); See supra text
accompanying notes 316-25.
493. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down state policy excluding women from admission to
state-supported military academy).
494. Id. at 568 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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For Justice Scalia, "tradition" is the starting point and the end-
ing point, the alpha and the omega, of constitutional analysis.
Tradition is the only interpretive principle that he brings to bear upon
the question of the meaning of Equal Protection, and he deems it to be
sufficient.
In 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson,495 the Supreme Court upheld a
law requiring blacks and whites to ride in separate railroad cars on
trains on the ground that the State "is at liberty to act with reference
to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people .... ,,496
This is the very same interpretive principle that is embraced by Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas. In light of the "tradition" and widespread
practice of racial segregation in America in 1954, would Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas have voted with the majority in Brown v. Board of
Education to overturn Plessy v. Ferguson?
In 1883 in Pace v. State497 the United States Supreme Court
upheld an Alabama law that made it a felony for blacks and whites to
marry or to have sex.498 In 1955, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld a
similar law on the ground that "[ilt is the considered opinion of the
people of more than half the States of the Union that the prohibition
against miscegenetic marriages is a proper governmental objective
... .,,499 Few social traditions in America were stronger than the prohi-
bition against interracial marriages. 50 0 If Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas had been on the Court in 1967, would they have voted with the
Court in Loving v. Virginia50 1 to strike down this law?
495. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding Louisiana law requiring separate railroad cars for
blacks and whites).
496. Id. at 550 (Brown, J.).
497. 106 U.S. 583 (1883) (upholding state statute making it a felony for a black person
and a white person to intermarry or to have sex with each other).
498. See id. at 583 (Field, J.) (setting forth provisions of state statute).
499. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 88 (1955), vacated, Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
500. See Tiffani Lennon, Stepping Out of the Competing Constitutional Rights
Conundrum: A Comparative Harm Analysis, 82 DENY. U. L. REV. 359, 394 ("[N]inety-two
percent of western whites surveyed in a 1958 Gallup poll opposed interracial marriage,
sending a clear message that the public did not support the legalization of marriage
between blacks and whites."). Attitudes towards interracial marriage are slowly changing.
The Pew Research Center, A Future Full of Promise: Optimism Reigns, Technology Plays
Key Role, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID=257 (last visited October 15,
2007) ("Younger Americans are also more positive about interracial marriages. Nearly
eight-in-ten young adults (78%) think they are good. This compares to only 38% of those
over age 65.").
501. 388 U.S. 1 (striking down state law prohibiting interracial marriage).
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In his dissenting opinions in Romer v. Evans50 2 and Lawrence v.
Texas,50 3 Justice Scalia uses harsh language to express outrage that
the majority would find that gay and lesbians have the constitutional
right to seek protection from discrimination on the same basis as other
groups,50 4 or that they have the right not to be imprisoned for engaging
in sexual activity. 50 5 For Justice Scalia, it is sufficient that society
"morally disapproves" of homosexuality. 50 6 The existence of that tradi-
tion of "moral disapproval," for Justice Scalia, precludes any
constitutional claim on behalf of homosexuals under Due Process or
Equal Protection. 50 7
502. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down state constitutional
amendment that prohibited the state legislature and any state agencies or political
subdivisions from adopting laws or policies prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation).
503. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down state law making it a crime to engage in sexual
conduct with someone of the same gender).
504. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to what was at stake as a
"Kulturkampf' (culture war)); id. (characterizing the members of the Supreme Court as
having been selected from an "elite class"); id. at 638 (referring to antidiscrimination laws
as "special treatment" and "preferential treatment"); id. (referring to the "hand wringing" of
the majority in their concern for gays and lesbians); id. at 639 (referring to
antidiscrimination laws as "obtain[ing] advantage"); id. at 640-41, 647 (referring to
antidiscrimination laws as "special protection" for gays and lesbians); id. at 642-43
(repeatedly referring to "homosexual 'orientation"' in quotes); id. at 644 (referring to
an tidiscrimination laws as "favored status"); id. at 652 (referring to the dispute as a "culture
war"); id. at 652-53 (characterizing those who favor eqfial treatment for gays and lesbians
as "Templars," the "lawyer class" with a "law-school view," in contrast to the "plebeian"
views of those who oppose equal rights); id. at 653 (referring again to antidiscrimination
laws as "preferential treatment").
505. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 587 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the majority's
use of the doctrine of stare decisis as "manipulative"); id. at 592 (referring to the decision of
the Court in Casey to reaffirm Roe as "a result-oriented expedient"); id. at 597 (observing, in
support of his argument that America has a tradition of criminalizing sexual conduct
between persons of the same gender, that "[tihere are also records of... 4 executions [for
sodomy] during the colonial period," without condemning the imposition of the death
penalty for homosexual conduct,); id. at 602 ("Today's opinion is the product of a Court,
which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called
homosexual agenda . . . ."); id. ("the Court has taken sides in the culture war ...."); id. at
604-05 ("the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), '[wihen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more enduring. .. ").
506. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Surely that is the only sort of
'animus' at issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral
disapproval that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in
Bowers. . . .Coloradans are, as I say, entitled to be hostile toward homosexual conduct
...."); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that "the belief of its
citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 'immoral and unacceptable.. . .' [wals a
legitimate governmental interest.").
507. See supra note 493.
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Justice Scalia's devotion to tradition rather than to equality is
also evident in his opinion in United States v. Virginia,508 where he
would have upheld another discriminatory official policy of the State of
Virginia - the prohibition against women attending the prestigious
state-supported military college, the Virginia Military Institute.509
Justice Scalia based his dissent primarily upon the tradition of male-
only military education. The first sentence of his opinion states: "To-
day the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of
the Commonwealth of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a
century and a half."510 He complains that the majority of the Court
"counts for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of
men's military colleges supported by both States and the Federal Gov-
ernment"511 At the close of his dissent in United States v. Virginia,
Justice Scalia waxed nostalgic over "The Code of the Gentleman," a
hodge-podge of rules of social etiquette from the gilded age based upon
an outmoded understanding of strict gender roles, which was con-
tained in a booklet that VMI freshmen were required to have in their
possession at all times. 512 This "Code of the Gentleman" recalls Justice
508. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating on Equal Protection grounds Virginia policy of
excluding women from state-supported military college).
509. See id. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
510. Id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the Supreme Court did
not "shut down" VMI, but rather ordered it to admit women on an equal basis, and that VMI
is operating as a coeducational institution.
511. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the Nation's service academies
are coeducational. See id. at 544-45 (Ginsburg, J.) ("Women's successful entry into the
federal military academies, and their participation in the Nation's military forces, indicate
that Virginia's fears for the future of VMI may not be solidly grounded.") (citations omitted).
512. See id. at 602-03 (Scalia, J.). Justice Scalia quoted "The Code of the Gentleman:
Without a strict observance of the fundamental Code of Honor, no man, no matter how
'polished,' can be considered a gentleman. The honor of a gentleman demands the
inviolability of his word, and the incorruptibility of his principles. He is the descendant of
the knight, the crusader; he is the defender of the defenseless and the champion of justice
... or he is not a Gentleman. A Gentleman... Does not discuss his family affairs in public
or with acquaintances. Does not speak more than casually about his girl friend. Does not go
to a lady's house if he is affected by alcohol. He is temperate in the use of alcohol. Does not
lose his temper; nor exhibit anger, fear, hate, embarrassment, ardor or hilarity in public.
Does not hail a lady from a club window. A gentleman never discusses the merits or
demerits of a lady. Does not mention names exactly as he avoids the mention of what things
cost. Does not borrow money from a friend, except in dire need. Money borrowed is a debt of
honor, and must be repaid as promptly as possible. Debts incurred by a deceased parent,
brother, sister or grown child are assumed by honorable men as a debt of honor. Does not
display his wealth, money or possessions. Does not put his manners on and off, whether in
the club or in a ballroom. He treats people with courtesy, no matter what their social
position may be. Does not slap strangers on the back nor so much as lay a finger on a lady.
Does not 'lick the boots of those above' nor 'kick the face of those below him on the social
ladder.' Does not take advantage of another's helplessness or ignorance and assumes that
no gentleman will take advantage of him. A Gentleman respects the reserves of others, but
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Brennan's admonition that the traditional attitude of "'romantic pater-
nalism' . . in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a
cage."513
The great jurisprudential battle which underlies all Equal Pro-
tection analysis, but which is particularly acute in emerging areas
such as gender equality and gay rights, is, "how are we to measure
equality under the Constitution?" Lincoln understood that the concept
of equality is an evolving one - that in fact, the principle of equality
imposes a moral obligation upon us to question received opinions about
people and to remain open to the possibility that our assumptions
about human potential are wrong. He taught us that the idea that "all
men are created equal" is an ideal that must be "constantly looked to,
constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, con-
stantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and
deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of
life to all people of all colors everywhere." 514
To go back to the "tradition" test that was used in Plessy, to find
that "moral disapproval" of a group is sufficient to justify official dis-
crimination, 515 to say that no law, no matter how arbitrary, how
unjust, how rooted in superstition or irrational fear, is unconstitutional
so long as it reflects "traditional" attitudes, would be to betray the sol-
emn duty of the Supreme Court to fulfill the principle of the
Declaration of Independence that "all men are created equal." Justice
Robert Jackson's great insight into the meaning of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is that the Supreme Court has the obligation under the
Constitution to determine whether or not there are "real differences"
"fairly related to the object of the regulation" between groups that are
being treated differently. 516 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas would
abrogate this fundamental, constitutional principle of equality.
demands that others respect those which are his. A Gentleman can become what he wills to
be. . .").
513. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (Brennan, J.)
514. Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Springfield, Illinois, (June 16, 1857), in 2 COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 405-06 (Roy P. Basler, ed., 1953), available at http://quod.lib.
umich.edu/cgi/tltext/text-idx?c=lincoln;cc=lincoln;view=toc;idno=lincoln2 (follow fourth
"Speech at Springfield, Illinois" hyperlink).
515. Compare supra text accompanying note 513 (citing Justice Scalia's position that
"moral disapproval" is a sufficient justification to support criminal laws against
homosexuality) with Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(stating that "[mioral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm a group, is an
interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection
Clause.").
516. See supra text accompanying notes 316-25.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Roosevelt Court made the following contributions to our
fundamental law:
The Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects against
governmental invasion of our personal, fundamental rights.5 17 The
Due Process Clause protects certain inalienable rights such as the
right to procreation, even though these rights may not be enumerated
in the Constitution.518 Any law that infringes upon a fundamental
constitutional right must be strictly scrutinized for its
constitutionality.5
19
The government may not coerce people - not even children -
into expressing a particular point of view.520 Even when a person en-
gages in speech that is not protected by the First Amendment, the
government may not prosecute the person under a law which is over-
broad in the sense that it would criminalize speech which is protected
by the First Amendment, because this would discourage other people
from exercising their First Amendment rights.521
People not only have an absolute right to hold whatever relig-
ious beliefs that they choose, they also have a constitutional right to
engage in religiously motivated conduct, although the right to engage
in religiously motivated conduct is not absolute. 522 The government
must be neutral with respect to religion. 523
The federal government has the authority to regulate all com-
mercial activity in the Nation which, in the aggregate, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 524
Some private actors are so imbued or have so imbued them-
selves with governmental authority that their behavior constitutes
"state action" which is subject to the dictates of the Constitution.525
All of the powers of the President stem either from the Consti-
tution or from statutes, and the President's power is at its lowest ebb
when the Congress has, by law, prohibited the President from act-
517. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69.
518. See id.
519. See supra text accompanying notes 155-61.
520. See supra text accompanying notes 204-10.
521. See supra text accompanying notes 211-17.
522. See supra text accompanying notes 226-29.
523. See supra text accompanying notes 231-37.
524. See supra text accompanying notes 255-65.
525. See supra text accompanying notes 276-93.
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ing. 526 The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the army and
navy, but he is not the Commander-in-Chief of the entire country; even
during wartime, the President is under the rule of law. 527
The government may not treat some groups of people differently
from other groups unless there are "real differences" between them.5 28
Official acts of racial discrimination must be strictly scrutinized. 529
State-sponsored racial segregation of the public schools is
unconstitutional.
5 30
The foregoing achievements in the interpretation of the Consti-
tution are impressive, but the march of human rights that the
Roosevelt Court commenced was not steady and regular. Instead the
Court took halting steps towards freedom. A slip back in Gobitis was
transformed into a rush forward in Barnette; the shameful retreat of
the Court in Korematsu was redeemed at least somewhat by the pride
we all feel for the advance in human rights that it achieved in Brown.
But the path of the law, though not always straight, is apparent in the
light of history. The fundamental principles that the Roosevelt Court
recognized - the fundamental principles that Franklin and Eleanor
Roosevelt stood for - have been become part of the fabric of our funda-
mental law, as the framers intended.
The overriding purpose of the New Deal was to create opportu-
nities for the common person to acquire a stake in society. The
Roosevelt appointees to the Supreme Court were unwilling to allow ei-
ther entrenched wealth or arbitrary governmental action to interfere
with that objective. They remade the Constitution, but in so doing
they returned the Constitution to its original purpose - the protection
of personal liberty. The Roosevelt Court laid the foundation for a juris-
prudence of human rights upon which the Warren Court and
subsequent Supreme Courts have continued to build.
Certainly the justices of the Roosevelt Court made some mis-
takes in their interpretation of the Constitution. But they did not
equate the principles of "liberty" and "equality" with "moral tradi-
tions." They did not take the position that the government has the
power to define what is "sacred" and what is "profane" for every indi-
vidual. They did not permit the government to endorse or promote
religion. They would not have allowed majority religions to define
what the minority may do or not do in the exercise of their religion.
526. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20 and notes 127-29.
527. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
528. See supra text accompanying notes 316-21.
529. See supra text accompanying notes 346-48.
530. See supra text accompanying notes 327-36.
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They did not ignore the reality of our economic development in inter-
preting the power of the federal government to regulate the national
economy. They did not pretend that by precluding application of Con-
stitutional norms to powerful private interests that they would be
promoting "individual freedom." And they did not rank the discretion
of the President above the Rule of Law. Either Justice Scalia or Jus-
tice Thomas or both of them have committed all of these errors in the
interpretation of the Constitution.
